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BEYOND NIGHTMARE AND HOPE:
ENGINEERING ELECTORAL PROPORTIONALITY IN
PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACIES
Yen-Tu Su*
I. INTRODUCTION
Electoral reform is often portrayed as a battle of virtue versus evil. To mobilize the
public's passions and support, advocates from both sides of the policy debate endeavor
to incorporate such rhetoric into their propaganda. In a sense, rhetoric simplifies the
trade-offs of electoral engineering, which is often considered a key role of constitutional/political engineering. However, only a thin line separates eloquence and overstatement. How can we ensure that an institutional design or reform proposal is based
on informed and reasonable judgment rather than bias and distortion? Given that institutional engineering remains more art than science,' it remains a significant challenge for
electoral engineers to withstand the allure of reductionism.
The fierce debate on the merits of adopting certain forms of proportional representation (PR) in presidential democracies exemplifies the difficulties of electoral engineering. Some scholars firmly believe that proportional representation systems are incompatible with presidential systems. According to their warnings, using PR to elect members of assemblies generally results in crises of govemability and, ultimately, a disastrous constitutional breakdown. But one person's nightmare is another's hope. Advocates of PR contend that only full and fair representation can promote true harmony in
divided societies. They believe that proportional representation is desirable in its own
right and should not be dismissed merely because of the increasing needs for coalition
building in the post-election political process. A quick review of the current literature
indicates that both sides of the policy debate emphasize different concerns of electoral
engineering: one focuses on issues of governability and the other accentuates concerns
for representativeness. The tension between govemability and representativeness has

*. Visiting Researcher, Harvard Law School. LL.M. 2003, Harvard Law School; LL.M. 1998, National
Taiwan University. This article derives from my LL.M. paper at Harvard Law School. I am deeply indebted
to Professor Heather Gerken for her supervision and constant encouragement. I would also like to thank
Professor Lani Guinier and the participants at the Visiting Scholars/Visiting Researchers Colloquium at Harvard Law School for their helpful comments. In addition, I am grateful to Paula Maute for her editing on an
early draft of this Article. Geoff Ciereck, along with other members of the Journal of Legislation, including
Chad Silker, Angela Petrucci, and Anna Smith, also provided valuable editorial assistance. All mistakes, of
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1. See Pippa Norris, Ballots Not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral
Systems, and Democratization,in THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT, AND DEMOCRACY 206, 213 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002) [hereinafter THE ARCHITECTURE OF
DEMOCRACY].
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long been identified as one of the most important issues in the electoral field. 2 But neither side of this debate takes the other side's concerns very seriously.
The cases of electoral reform in the United States and Taiwan further demonstrate
some interesting contrasts. While proponents of electoral reform in the United States
seek to change the dominant single-member districts (SMDs) into multi-member districts (MMDs), reformers in Taiwan want to abandon MMDs and use SMDs in districtelections instead; while people in the United States hope to vitalize the static politics by
increasing the proportionality of the congressional electoral system, reformers in Taiwan
hope to decrease the electoral proportionality of legislative elections so as to enhance
political stability and maintain social harmony. Likewise, the arguments against the
proposed electoral reforms in these two countries present a symmetrical contrast as well:
opponents of the PR movement in the United States worry that adopting the proposed
semi-proportional electoral system would exacerbate the "balkanization" of American
politics and threaten the political stability of American presidential democracy; some
political scientists in Taiwan, on the other hand, contend that proportional representation
is inherently meritorious and that the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system-as
the German model exemplifies-is a better alternative for Taiwan's electoral reform.
In the midst of the theoretical and political debates, how can we evaluate and engineer the electoral proportionality of legislative elections in a presidential democracy? Is
proportional representation incompatible with presidential systems? Or does the constitutional structure of dual democratic legitimacy invite us to combine two different types
of representation in a presidential democracy? Do the concerns of political fairness or
representativeness actually favor the principle of proportional representation? Or must
we make the tough choice between different visions of democracy? This article reevaluates the current academic debate on the merits of proportional representation in presidential systems. My main thesis is that neither the Linzian nightmare of a resulting
constitutional breakdown, nor the Guinierian hope of a consociational democracy should
control our political judgment. Instead, in designing legislative electoral systems, electoral engineers must make inevitable trade-offs based on pragmatic considerations as
well as philosophical reflections. Even though composing the sound bite of electoral
reform is necessary for political mobilization, the deliberation of reform proposals
should go beyond the competing rhetoric of the current debate.
This Article is organized as follows: Part II reviews the literature on constitutional
engineering in general and electoral engineering in presidential democracies in particular. In addition, I examine the proposals of electoral reform in the United States and
Taiwan. The case studies of the United States and Taiwan confirm that governability
and representativeness are the two main concerns of those undertaking the difficult task
of engineering electoral proportionality in presidential democracies. Part III examines
the substantial controversies over the concerns of governability. By clarifying and reexamining the factual assumptions and value judgments inherent in the concerns of governability, I argue that neither the conventional thesis of the Linzian nightmare nor the
minority opinion that expresses optimism in this regard is conclusive. Whether the con-

2. See Larry Diamond, Three Paradoxes of Democracy, in THE GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY
95, 100-03 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1993); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1160 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY].
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cerns of govemability would counsel for or against the use of PR in presidential democracies is a question that requires our political judgment. Part IV reviews the grand debate over the relative desirability of proportional versus majoritarian representation.
After confirming that political equality concerns are not decisive because competing
visions of representative democracy still exist and are not entirely reconcilable, Part IV
then analyzes the proportional and majoritarian visions of democracy, examining the
concepts of representation and visions of politics associated with these two distinct visions. The indeterminacy of political philosophy and the emergence of hybrid systems
in comparative politics further lead me to conclude that our concerns of representativeness should be liberated from the majoritarian-proportional dichotomy.
II.

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND PROPOSALS OF REFORM IN PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACIES

The electoral system is not merely a part of a democratic country's constitutional
arrangements; it is a crucial part of the constitutional institutions, for it provides the
most important linkages between the people and their representative government. 3 By
filtering and channeling the voters' will into government, the electoral system can not
only profoundly impact the prospects of social integration, but can also deeply affect
governmental performance. Due to these two far-reaching effects, designs of electoral
rules are often deemed "the most powerful instrument available for institutional engineering."4 Consequently, we can never fully analyze an electoral system if we treat it as
an isolated institution without considering its political and social contexts. 5
Examining electoral systems from the perspective of institutional engineering is a
prevalent approach in constitutional politics studies. In the context of political decisionmaking, this approach probably has a relative advantage of coordinating a broader platform for normative consideration compared with the right-centered jurisprudence developed by constitutional lawyers. Before we enter the substantial debates of electoral
engineering, however, we need to understand the basic presumptions of this approach
and then transform the institutional phenomena, along with the policy discourses in real
politics, into the engineer's source materials. This section aims to fulfill these objectives. First, I elaborate upon the mechanisms and significance of electoral rules in a
given constitutional system, explaining why it is an appropriate approach to discuss
electoral designs in the manner of institutional engineering. Later, I focus on the electoral designs and reform proposals in presidential democracies. After a general survey
of the current electoral systems adopted by countries with presidential systems, I look
into the electoral reform proposals in the United States and Taiwan respectively and
comparatively. Based on these two case studies, I then confirm and outline the two
basic concerns of electoral engineering.

3. Conceiving the electoral system as an important part of the constitutional system has long been proposed by many scholars of constitutional politics.
See, e.g., GIOVANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING: AN INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES, AND OUTCOMES (2d ed. 1997).

4. Norris, supra note 1, at 207.
5. See, e.g., ANDREW REYNOLDS & BEN REILLY, THE INTERNATIONAL IDEA HANDBOOK OF ELECTORAL
SYSTEM DESIGN 122 (1997) [hereinafter IDEA HANDBOOK OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN].
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A. ElectoralSystem and ConstitutionalEngineering
Designing an electoral system is a sub-project of constitutional/institutional engineering. For many scholars of comparative politics, it is even perceived as the key to
designing or reforming the constitutional system.6 To fully appreciate the significance of
electoral systems and electoral engineering, the basic concepts of "constitutional engineering" need to be outlined. Generally speaking, the theme of constitutional engineering involves a specific way of seeing politics and a normative-programmatic attitude
toward institutional design: a constitutional engineer tends to perceive constitutional
politics as an institutional phenomenon and tends to concentrate on the impacts of institutional arrangements on real politics. Although the process of institutional construction
in the real world is inevitably entangled with bias, short-sighted calculations, and political compromises, a constitutional engineer would endeavor to pursue his or her normative ideals or programmatic objectives.7 Among the myriad institutional factors that
affect a constitutional democracy, the constitutional framework of the executivelegislative relations, the party system, and the electoral system are probably the three
major concerns of constitutional engineers. s A further survey of these three factors and
their correlations may help us understand the theses of constitutional engineering in
general and electoral engineering in particular.
1. The Constitutional Framework of Executive-Legislative Relations
When scholars' interests in the institutional aspects of politics were revived in the
mid-1980s, the vices and virtues of different regime types had been hotly debated in the
field of comparative politics. 9 What underlie the differentiations and categorizations of
regime types are basically the different arrangements of the relationship between the
executive and legislative branches.' 0 In a presidential system, the executive and legislative branches have a rigid separation of powers. In a parliamentary system, on the other
hand, the executive branch is responsible to the parliament. Typological disputes still
rage over the so-called semi-presidential system in which a popularly-elected president
possesses considerable powers, but the executive function is largely performed by a
premier-led cabinet that is responsible to the legislature." Although in certain circum6. See Dieter Nohlen, Electoral Systems and Electoral Reform in Latin America, in INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 44 (Arend Lijphart & Carlos H.
Waisman eds., 1996).
7. For a general observation on the ideals and realities of constitutional engineering, see Donald L.
Horowitz, ConstitutionalDesign: ProposalsVersus Processes, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY, supra
note 1, at 15-36.
8. Of course, there are other important dimensions of constitutional engineering, such as the choice
between federalism and unitarism, between unicameralism and bicameralism, and between different forms of
judicial review. For a more detailed discussion, see generally AREND LUPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY:
GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIx COUNTRIES (1999) [hereinafter LUPHART,
PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY].
9. The famous presidential-parliamentary debate may trace back to Professor Juan Linz's seminal critique of presidentialism in 1984, which was widely circulated before its formal publication a decade later. See
generally Juan J. Linz, Presidentialor Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?, in THE
FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY, VOLUME I, COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 3 (Juan J. Linz & Arturo
Valenzuela eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY].
10. See LUPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 116.
11. For discussions of the semi-presidential systems, see Maurice Durveger, A New Political System
Model: Semi-PresidentialGovernment, 8 EUR. J. POL. RES. 165 (1980); Giovanni Sartori, Neither Presiden-
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stances the distinctive characteristics of such hybrids require special consideration, most
of the time hybrid systems are nonetheless categorized in terms of the presidential12
parliamentary dichotomy, based on the roles and political strength of the presidents.
The constitutional framework of the executive-legislative relations is of great importance not only because these two political branches are the central stage of "government formation" and policy making, but also because the framework defines the actual
contour of a democracy. In the parliamentary system, only parliamentary representatives are directly elected by the people, and thus the political legitimacy of the executive
branch is completely dependent on parliamentary confidence. 13 On the other hand, in the
presidential system, both the president and the assembly are popularly elected; the rigid
separation of powers in this regime type, accordingly, is sustained by the arrangement of
dual democratic legitimacy. 14 In this regard, the presidential-parliamentary distinction
also implies different tasks of the electoral system.
Determining which regime type is better for the consolidation and sustainable development of democracy is a controversial issue. While different preferences exist,
most of the participants of this grand debate seem to agree that the impacts of a specific
regime type on the performance of a democracy are neither straightforward nor determinative.15 After all, political actors operate the system, and their behavior is not solely
shaped by institutional incentives. Though our inquiry is centered on the impacts of
institutional design, it runs the risk of oversimplification if we fail to consider the profound impacts of the party system and electoral system on the function of the presidential or parliamentary system.' 6 For instance, a Westminster-style parliamentary system
rarely involves coalitional governments, yet parliamentary regimes with multi-party
system often contain them.' 7 Many scholars also contend that a presidential system
would function better if the party system is moderately disciplined and less fragmented.18 Designing a constitutional framework for executive-legislative relations,
therefore, is just a starting point, not the whole story of constitutional engineering.
2. The Party System
Modem democracies depend on party politics, but the roles of political parties and
the structures of party competition vary from country to country. This simple fact of
comparative politics indicates that a party system may be an important variable for the
tialism nor Parliamentarism,in THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 106. Shugart and Carey use
another term-- "premier-presidentialism"--to characterize such a regime; they further identify a similar yet
somewhat different hybrid type, the "president-parliamentary" system. See MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART &
JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS 23-

27 (1992) [hereinafter SHUGART & CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES].
12. See LuPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 121-24.
13. Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism,in THE GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 108, 109
(Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1993).
14. On the connection between ideas of "democratic legitimacy" and ideas of "separation of powers," see
Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 642-44 (2000).
15. See Richard Gunther, The Relative Merits (and Weaknesses) of Presidential,Parliamentaryand SemiPresidentialSystems: The Backgroundto ConstitutionalReform, 11 J. SOC. SC. & PHIL. 61, 68 (1999).
16. Id. at 69.
17. See LUPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 10-11.
18. See, e.g., Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Shugart, Juan Linz, Presidentialismand Democracy: A Criti-

cal Appraisal(1993), available at http://www.nd.edu/-kellogg/WPS/200.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2004). This
proposition will be discussed more thoroughly in Part IHL
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outcome or performance of a democracy. The term "party system" generally encompasses two aspects of party politics in a given country. The first is the effective number
of parties; from this measure we can distinguish several types of party systems, ranging
from a two-party system to a multi-party system without a dominant party.' 9 This numerical feature is of great importance because it has a significant impact on the logic or
spirit of politics: the two-party system exemplifies the majoritarian vision of politics,
whereas the multi-party system highlights the necessity of coalition building. 20 The effective number of parties also seems to influence the stability and even the survival of a
democracy.2' Controlling the fragmentation of a party system thus becomes a salient
task of constitutional engineering.
The second feature of the party system is the degree of party discipline or party cohesion. This feature may reflect the political strength of parties and indicate the roles
played by parties in the election phase as well as the post-election phase of the political
process. Significant correlations also exist between party discipline and the performance of a presidential or parliamentary system: it is often argued that a parliamentary
system needs and should encourage the development of leadership and loyalty within
parties. 22 The prsdnal
presidential system, ono
on the other hand, does not favor highly disciplined
parties, especially during periods of divided government, but a moderate degree of party
discipline is still recommended to maintain stable coalitions and avoid the excessive use
23
of clientelism and patronage.
The party system that a country develops is largely contingent on her social cleavage and political culture, but several institutional arrangements seem to provide important incentives for the development of the party system as well. Since the famous Duverger's Law (stating that single-member districts, along with the plurality method, tend
to favor two-party systems) and Duverger's Hypothesis (stating that PR and two-round
systems encourage multipartism) came into being almost half a century ago, the electoral system has been deemed the most powerful leverage a constitutional engineer possesses in affecting the requisite number of parties. 24 The electoral system is also considered the major institutional determinant of party discipline. 25 Through the mediation of
the party system, the electoral system further exerts great influence over the performance of the presidential and parliamentary systems. To complete the project of constitutional engineering, therefore, we must consider influences of the electoral system.

19. The "effective number of parties" is an index that considers the relative strengths of parties when
calculating the number of parties in a party system. For the calculating formulas and the implications of this
concept, see LIJPHART, PATrERNS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 65-69.
20. Id. at 62-63.
21. "Balkanization" that results from multipartism is often considered a serious threat both to parliamentary and presidential systems. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 14, at 653-57.
22. See THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 62-64.
23. See Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Soberg Shugart, Conclusion: Presidentialismand the Party System,
in PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY INLATIN AMERICA 394, 418-21 (Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., 1997) [hereinafter Mainwaring & Shugart, Conclusion].
24. On the links between electoral system and party system, see LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY,
supra note 8, at 165-70.
25. See Mainwaring & Shugart, Conclusion,supra note 23, at 421-29.
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3. The Electoral System
There are different types of elections in democratic regimes (especially in presidential democracies where both the presidents and the legislatures are popularly elected),
but studies of electoral systems usually focus on methods of electing legislatures. 6
There are also various dimensions of electoral rules, but their systematic characteristic is
distinguished by the way they translate votes into seats.27 The basic function of the electoral system, in a nutshell, is to determine which candidate(s) may win the seat(s) in an
election. To perform this function, an electoral system at least has to specify (a) how
many seats will be contested in a district (i.e., the concept of "district magnitude") and
(b) how to count the votes and convert them into seats (i.e., the concept of "electoral
formulas").28
Based on the different arrangements of the vote-seat relationship, the literature identifies three major types of electoral systems. 29 The first type, the plurality-majority system, refers to electoral systems that combine "single-member district" (SMD) with "plurality rule" (first-past-the-post) or "majority formula., 30 Under this kind of arrangement,
only the candidates who are supported by the largest number of voters in their respective
districts can become representatives, whereas those candidates who are supported by the
minorities get nothing. 31 In other words, the plurality-majority system exemplifies the
principle of majority rule in the election phase of the political process.
The second type, the system of proportional representation (PR), combines "multimember districts" with some special electoral formulas in order to assign seats in proportion to votes as accurately as possible. 32 Compared to the winner-take-all effect of
26. In presidential democracies, the electoral formula for the presidency and the relative timing of elections for the two political branches are also important components of the electoral system. For a detailed
discussion of these two determinants, see John M. Carey, Constitutional Choices and the Performance of
PresidentialRegimes, 11 J. SOC. SC. & PHIL. 93, 94-106 (1999); MARK P. JONES, ELECTORAL LAWS AND
THE SURVIVAL OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACIES 88-118 (1995).
27. See IDEA HANDBOOK OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 7; DAVID M. FARRELL,
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 4 (2001).

28. "District magnitude" and "electoral formula" are often considered the two major components of an
electoral system because they have the strongest effects on the electoral proportionality, upon which the classification of the electoral systems is drawn. But it should be noted that there are other components of an electoral system. For example, the rules or mechanism of "electoral thresholds," which refer to the minimum level
of support a party or candidate needs to gain representation, may also exert significant influence on the function of the electoral system. For a more detailed introduction to the attributes of electoral system, see
LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 144, 146.
29. See IDEA HANDBOOK OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 17-23; FARRELL, supra note
27, at 6-10. See generally DOUGLAS J. AMY, BEHIND THE BALLOT Box: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO VOTING
SYSTEMS (2000).
30. The First Past the Post (FPTP) system and the Two-Round System (TRS) represent the use of plurality rule and majority formula respectively. Under the FPTP, the winning candidate in each single-member
district is the one who gains more votes than any other candidate. The Two-Round System, on the other hand,
requires an absolute majority of votes for a candidate to win the election; a second round of voting is conducted, accordingly, if no candidate received majority support in the first round.
31. This is also the reason why it is often termed as the "winner-take-all" system.
32. List PR, Mixed Member Proportional (MMP), and Single Transferable Vote (STV)are the three
forms of proportional representation. Under the List PR system, each party presents a slate of candidates for
voters to cast their ballots, and parties receive seats in proportion to their share of the national vote. The MMP
system combines a single-member district system with a List PR system; while half of the representatives are
elected in district elections and the other half are elected by the List PR, the List PR seats will compensate for
any disproportionality produced by the district elections. The STV system functions in multi-member districts
where voters can rank their preferences and their votes will be reallocated according to their preferences until
all seats for the constituency are filled.
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the plurality-majority system, PR does not create legislative majority by significantly
distorting the proportionality of vote-seat relations.33 Hence, electoral minorities may be
represented under PR as long as their votes can surpass the relatively lower "electoral
threshold" inherent in PR.
The third type, the semi-proportional system, signifies the intermediate system that
34
has no apparent disposition or propensity with respect to vote-seat proportionality.
Under this type of system, candidates of small parties still have a chance to win seats,
but there still exist certain degrees of vote-seat disproportionality: the "seat-bonuses" are
assigned either to large or small parties depending on many variables such as the district
magnitude, electoral formula, geographical politics, and the strategies of political actors
(including voters).35
Two lines of argument may explain why electoral and constitutional engineering
focus on the vote-seat proportionality. The first argument focuses on the normative
implications of different electoral systems. Both Professors Lijphart and Powell assert
that there are basically two visions/patterns of representative democracy from the perspective of comparative politics: one envisions the majoritarian ideal and promises that
voters may control policymakers through elections, while the other emphasizes the values of proportional representation and seeks to promote consensual politics. 36 Though
other constitutional arrangements should not be ignored, the electoral system often plays
a leading role in reflecting or shaping the vision of democracy in a given country. Engineering electoral proportionality, therefore, not only focuses on how an electoral system
should work, but also reflects the fundamental values and ideals that a democracy wants
to pursue.
The significance of the electoral system can also be gauged in terms of its practical
impact on politics and society. Although the famous Duverger's Law and Duverger's
Hypothesis are controversial propositions of reductionism or determinism, 37 most political scientists agree that, in general, there is a strong negative relationship between the
degree of electoral disproportionality and the effective number of parties in a legislature. 38 The intra-party cohesion or party discipline is also heavily influenced by the design of an electoral system. 39 For example, some electoral systems, such as the closedlist PR, would give party leaders plenary power to control the nomination of candidates
and thus enhance the degree of party discipline. 4° On the other hand, in systems where
33. In other words, though PR cannot achieve full vote-seat proportionality, it seeks to minimize the
degree of distortion. See FARRELL, supra note 27, at 12.
34. The most commonly used semi-proportional system are the parallel systems in which both PR lists
and single-member districts are used, but the PR seats and the district seats are allocated separately-in other
words, the List PR seats under the parallel systems do not compensate for the disproportional district elections.
Cumulative Voting (CV), Limited Voting (LV) and Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) are also semiproportional systems. These three electoral formulas are used in conjunction with multi-member districts, the
only difference among them is the number of votes each voter can cast.
35. "Seat bonus" is a buzzword that refers to a party's advantage of overrepresentation resulting from the
disproportionality of the electoral system. See Gary W. Cox & Emerson Niou, Seat Bonuses under the Single
Nontransferable Vote System: Evidencefrom Japanand Taiwan, 26 COMP. POL. 221 (1994).
36. See LIIPHART, PATrERNS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 1-8; G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR.,
ELECTIONS As INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY: MAJORITARIAN AND PROPORTIONAL VISIONS 4-7 (2000)
[hereinafter POWELL, ELECTIONS As INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY].
37. For a detailed discussion of Durverger's propositions and their critics, see GARY W. COX, MAKING
VOTES COUNT: STRATEGIC COORDINATION IN THE WORLD'S ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 14-33 (1997).
38. See LUPHART, PATrERNS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 168; FARRELL, supra note 27, at 162.
39. See IDEA HANDBOOK OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 8.
40. Mainwaring & Shugart, Conclusion,supra note 23, at 422-23.
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candidates rely on their personal efforts rather than party approbation to win elections,
parties tend to be less disciplined and even more fractionalized. 41 These salient effects
upon the logic and climate of real politics have great influence on the long-term prospect
of political integration, which is a fundamental objective of political order that often
raises grave concerns in divided societies. Political scientists contest the type of electoral systems that would better serve divided societies in terms of "conflict management. 4 2 It seems that different electoral systems would incorporate different strategies
of conflict management, and no single system is probably superior to others in a variety
of social contexts.43
B. ElectoralReform in PresidentialDemocracies
With the background knowledge outlined above, we can now see the dynamics of
electoral design or electoral reform through the lens of constitutional engineering. The
next step is to take a closer look at the electoral systems and proposals of reform in
presidential democracies. 44 An overview of the current electoral systems in a sample of
presidential democracies could inform us that even in similar contexts of constitutional
frameworks, the arrangements of electoral system still vary from country to country.
Nonetheless, a comparative analysis of the dynamics of electoral reform may reveal
similar considerations of electoral engineering in presidential democracies. This inquiry
looks into the ongoing movements of electoral reform in the United States and Taiwan.
The selection of these two cases anticipates that they represent an established and transitional democracy respectively, and that they might shed some new light on the current
discussions on the experiences of presidential regimes in Latin America and Eastern
Europe. Apart from brief descriptions of the relevant political agenda in real politics,
this inquiry focuses on the rationales of the reform proposals. Accordingly, the problems of the current systems and the proposed solutions are mainly illustrated from the
electoral reformers' perspectives.
1. Electoral Systems in Presidential Democracies: An Overview
Some scholars of comparative politics believe that presidential regimes share a
common style of constitutional politics. Professor Linz argues that presidentialism "introduces a strong element of zero-sum game into democratic politics with rules that tend
toward a 'winner-take-all' outcome. ' 45 Professor Lijphart similarly contends that "presidential systems tend to be inherently majoritarian." 46 With respect to the impacts of
presidential elections and presidential cabinets on the political culture, these observations are probably right. But it would be a huge mistake to assume that in presidential

41. Id. at 426-27.
42. For an overview of this debate, see Benjamin Reilly, Electoral Systems for Divided Societies, 13 J.
DEM. 156, 156-59 (2002).
43. See id. at 168-69.
44. This Article uses "presidential democracies" or "presidential regimes" as a general term referring to
countries whose presidents are popularly elected and possess substantial powers. In addition to typical presidential systems, semi-presidential systems in certain countries are also within the purview of these terms.
45. THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 18.
46. LUPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 161.
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democracies the electoral systems for the assemblies are invariably majoritarianoriented.
In fact, presidential democracies have various types of legislative electoral systems.
The United States and the French Fifth Republic (except the list-PR election in 1986)
elect their legislatures under plurality-majority systems. These two countries are exceptions from the perspective of comparative politics, since most presidential democracies
use non-majoritarian electoral systems to elect their legislatures. For instance, the Philippines, Russia, South Korea, and Taiwan now all use semi-proportional systems; with
the exception of Chile and Mexico, presidential democracies in Latin America elect their
representatives via systems of proportional representation. While plurality-majority
systems are often deemed as the "ideal" or "default" electoral systems for presidential
democracies, it is apparent that, in reality, non-majoritarian electoral systems are the
mainstream.
The disparities of the electoral systems in different presidential democracies stem
from various historical and political factors. Many countries adopted their current electoral systems deliberately. For example, France devised its "two-round system" in the
hope of transforming its fragmented party system into a more stable, two-bloc system.47
But few engineers have enjoyed the privilege of carrying out their original designs; political compromises are often inevitable. 48 Furthermore, the electoral systems in several
countries are better viewed as historical contingencies of which the perceptions shaped
by colonial experiences are often extended to post-colonial periods without conscious
reconsideration. 49 The present electoral systems of the United States and Taiwan, for
example, were largely shaped by British and Japanese traditions, respectively. 50 Proponents of electoral reform in such nations may find it difficult to persuade people to
change an electoral system that has long been taken for granted, even though they have a
strong argument in urging the public to make a deliberate choice between the current
system and other promising alternatives. 5'
2. The Case of the United States
Since 1842, when the U.S. Congress began to exercise its power to regulate elections for senators and representatives, single-member districts have become the fundamental element of the congressional electoral system in the United States.5 2 The long47.

See Ezra N.

Suleiman, Presidentialism and Political Stability in France, in THE FAILURE OF

PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 146-48.

48. For example, the adoption of a parallel system that combines PR and SMDs is often regarded as a
result of political compromise between parties and politicians who have different preferences. See Olga
Shvetsova, Institutions and Coalition Building in Post-Communist Transitions, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF
DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 64-65.
49. See Horowitz, supra note 7, at 31-32.
50. On the historical development of the American electoral systems, see, e.g., Richard H. Pildes &
Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 258-59 (arguing
that "no deliberative choice between territorial districts and alternative voting systems was made when the
American commitment to the former was established.") On the Japanese influence over Taiwan's current
electoral system, see YEH-LIH WANG, Bi JIAO XUAN Ju ZHI Du [COMPARATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS] 12428(1998).
51. Electoral reform in established democracies seems to be more difficult than that which occurred in
transitional democracies. Many political scientists argue that electoral reform is very uncommon in established democracies because people tend to prefer the status quo regardless of its faults. See, e.g., FARRELL,
supra note 27, at 179.
52. On the history of the congressional electoral system in the United States, see generally THE LAW OF
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term practice of the winner-take-all system has profoundly influenced the emergence
and persistence of the American two-party system, which is often considered an important contributor to a stable democracy and effective government in this country.53 The
territorial districting under this system also facilitates politics of constituency service,
assuring that political accountability is not just an empty promise of representative democracy. 4 However, majoritarian representation is not the only answer to democracy
and electoral justice, nor is it necessarily better than other visions of democracy and
political equality. After all, a system that benefits some people may be detrimental for
others. From the dissenters' viewpoint, the architecture of single-member districts is,
among other things, liable for the following flaws of American democracy:
(1) Representationaldeficit: The very logic of the single-member districts indicates
that a significant portion (sometimes even the majority) of the voters cannot be represented by people they voted for. This is not a problem for a homogeneous society where
people living in an electoral district have the same interests or share similar values, nor
is it a serious challenge for a plural society where voting majorities shift from time to
time.55 However, the United States has developed into a heterogeneous society where
polarized voting often dominates the election results. Various minority groups thus
often complain that their interests are overlooked by the government because they are
"permanent losers" under the current electoral system.56 Professors Guinier and Torres
mark this problem by the term "representational synecdoche"-"the part substituted for
the whole"-because only the pluralities or majorities have their say in the electoral
process.57 From a similar viewpoint of interest representation, the problem can also be
characterized as "representational deficit," because the current winner-take-all system
simply fails to channel diverse interests into the formal political process. Regardless of
the terminology, this problem can result in a serious crisis in political legitimacy and
social integration, for the excluded minorities might lose faith in the fairness of the po58
litical process and ultimately reject "the tyranny of the majority.
(2) Nightmares of gerrymandering: Given that people with different interests or
values do not choose their residence randomly, districting or redistricting is inherently a
thorny task for plurality-majority systems.59 It is a more serious problem in the United
States, because most of the states leave the task of drawing district maps to politicians,
allowing representatives to choose their constituents. Systematic manipulation is ineviDEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 1156-59.
53. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144-45 (1986) (O'Connor J., concurring) (noting that
"the emergence of a strong and stable two-party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound
and effective government"); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 174-77 (2003)

(arguing that a two-party system tends to reduce the intensity of ideological conflict and thus promote political
stability).
54. On the theory that territorial districting can promote accountability, see Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme
Court Destabilizationof Single-Member Districts, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205, 229-30 (1995).
55. Under these two social contexts, the fear of majority tyranny can be alleviated by the realization of
"adequate representation" or "virtual representation." See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY:
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 77-78 (1994) [hereinafter GUINIER, THE
TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY].

56. The under-representation of racial minorities is the most salient example in this respect, but other
minority groups are also similarly situated. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY:
ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 171-72 (2002) [hereinafter GUINIER &
TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY].

57. Id. at 169.
58. See GU1NIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, supra note 55, at 9-12.

59. See AMY, supra note 29, at 37.
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table under this scheme, and it often threatens the fairness of political competition. Although the U.S. Supreme Court strives to tackle the harms of gerrymandering, its inconsistent jurisprudence since it entered the political thicket forty years ago only aggravates
the grievous concerns of electoral justice. 60 In a society where race is intertwined with
politics, it is difficult to understand why politicians cannot create a majority-minority
district for the sake of enhancing minority representation, but are allowed to do so if the
main purpose is to protect incumbents.6'
(3) Inert politics: In the beginning of their influential article, Professors Issacharoff
and Pildes report that "democratic politics today in the United States is widely perceived
as unimaginaive, frozen, devoid of genuine significance, and personality-rather-thanissue driven." 62 This negative description is largely supported by the especially low
voter turnout in the United States, a worrisome phenomenon that may worsen the socioeconomic inequality and endanger democracy. 63 Not surprisingly, the winner-take-all
electoral system is an important institutional factor in this problem. Studies of comparative politics clearly indicate that the plurality-majority systems are often associated with
low voter turnout, 64 and students of electoral engineering do not consider this correlation
a statistical coincidence. 65 Professor Amy, for example, suggests that under the winnertake-all system voters are more prone to abstain, either because they know their votes
will be "wasted," or because they think that sincere voting carries little impact on the
election results (which are often predetermined in safe districts). 66 Based on such allegations, Professors Guinier and Torres further conclude that "our winner-take-all elections have recreated a political hierarchy that diminishes the people's role in determining their own destiny and privileges institutional order over widespread and ongoing
67
public participation.'
For proponents of electoral reform, increasing electoral proportionality is the key to
addressing these problems. By moving toward proportional representation, the U.S.
House of Representatives can be more representative and more responsive to diverse
interests. The congressional elections under the proposed system can also be more
68
competitive, more issue-oriented, and less dependent on the way districts are drawn.
However, "proportional representation" in this context is merely a vague concept that
highlights the general orientation of electoral reform.
Some proponents of electoral reform in the United States do argue for the establishment of a List PR or the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system, the two lead60. For a thorough critique of the harms of gerrymandering and the Court's problematic jurisprudence,
see Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593 (2002).
61. For an analysis and critique of the U.S. Supreme Court's "politics, but not race" approach, see id. at
630-38.
62. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 644 (1998).
63. See Arend Lijphart, Unequal Participation:Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma, 91 AM. POL. SCi.
REV. 1 (1997); MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, WHERE HAVE ALL THE VOTERS GONE? (2002).

64. See

World

Policy

Institute,

Voter

Turnout

Comparisons,

available

at

http://www.worldpolicy.org/globalrights/democracy/turnout.html.

65. For the impact of the electoral system on voter turnout, see Andreas Ladner & Henry Milner, Do
Voters Turn out More under Proportionalthan MajoritarianSystems? The Evidence from Swiss Communal
Elections, 18 ELEcTORAL STUD. 235 (1999).

66. See AMY, supra note 29, at 39-40.
67. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 56, at 172.
68. On the arguments for proportional representation, see also ROBERT RICHIE & STEVEN HILL, WHOSE
VOTE COUNTS? 9-18 (2001).
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ing paradigms of proportional representation in Western democracies. 69 But these two
options are often ruled out by their colleagues, partly because the required changes are
too radical, and partly because Americans do not like political parties. 70 To satisfy the
demand of practicability or other instrumental considerations, many reformers in turn
propose Multi-Member Districts (MMD) in conjunction with electoral formulas like
Cumulative Voting (CV), Limited Voting (LV), and Single Transferable Vote (STV). 7 1
As noted above, CV and LV are better labeled as semi-proportional systems since they
cannot achieve proportional results consistently. 72 The STV system, by contrast, is more
likely to deliver a high degree of electoral proportionality in a nonpartisan setting, but its
complexity also limits its popularity to a small circle of electoral engineers. Another
often discussed alternative is the Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), a form of preference
voting held in single-member districts. 7 3 Since IRV does not alter the winner-take-all
effect of the single-member districts, PR advocates often decline to endorse it as an
acceptable substitute.74
During the recent Congressional sessions, some relevant bills were introduced in the
House. For instance, both the Voter Choice Act 75 (sponsored by Rep. Cynthia A.
McKinney) and the States' Choice of Voting Systems Act 76 (introduced by Rep. Melvin
L. Watt) seek to loosen the rigid requirement of single-member districts, permitting
states to create multi-member districts for congressional elections. In 2001, several
77
representatives also sponsored a bill (the Federal Elections Review Commission Act)
that would establish a special commission to study issues of electoral reform, including
the impacts of the winner-take-all system and the feasibility of proportional representation. Despite the activists' enthusiasm, however, changing the congressional electoral
system is still a minor issue on the American political agenda. The controversy of the
2000 presidential election prompted a movement for electoral reform, but the constitutional moment of the structural reform is yet to occur.

69. See id. at 28 (preferring an open party list system in three-seat districts). It should also be noted that
Professor Guinier, while being famous for her advocacy of Cumulative Voting, speaks in favor of the List PR
and MMP. See Lani Guinier, And to the C Students: The Lessons of Bush v. Gore, in A BADLY FLAWED
ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 231, 258-59

(Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002) [hereinafter Guinier, The Lessons of Bush v. Gore].
70. Professor Briffault notes that List PR "presumes a degree of party cohesion and partisanship alien to
the American experience." Richard Briffault, Lani Guinier and the Dilemmas of American Democracy, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 418, 435 (1995) (book review). Professor McKaskle also argues that Party-List (List PR)
system is not a viable alternative mainly because "[t]he electorate of the United States is hugely distrustful of
party organizations." Paul L. McKaskle, Of Wasted Votes and No Influence: An Essay on Voting Systems in
the United States, 35 HoUs. L. REV. 1119, 1158 (1998). In addition, Professor Williams argues that List PR
would do little to enhance the fairness of group representation in the United States, for the parties under this
system usually reflect ideological differences rather than different group identities such as gender and race.
MELISSA S. WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND MEMORY: MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THE FAILINGS OF
LIBERAL REPRESENTATION 219-20 (1998) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND MEMORY].

71.
note 2,
72.
73.

For a comprehensive introduction to these alternative proposals, see THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supra
at 722-65 (1998).
See AMY, supra note 29, at 112.
See RICHIE & HILL, supra note 68, at 24-26.

74. See Douglas J. Amy, InstantRunoff Voting: No Substitutefor ProportionalRepresentation,available

at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/articles/irv.htm.
75. H.R. 1189, 107"hCong. (2001).
76. H.R. 1173, 106" Cong. (1999).
77. H.R. 57, 107" Cong. (2001).
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3. The Case of Taiwan
In many aspects, Taiwan is a typical case of the third wave of democratization. The
democratic transition in Taiwan can be traced back to 1986, when the anti-authoritarian
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was formed, but the authoritarian regime controlled by the old Koumintang (KMT) was not transformed into a democratically legitimate government until 1992, when all members of the Legislature were finally elected
by the people in Taiwan.7 8 From 1992 until 2003, Taiwan underwent two popular presidential elections, four legislative elections, and two elections for the once permanent
National Assembly. 79 As a result of free elections, the KMT's one-party dominance was
gradually replaced by multi-party competition. The first regime turnover, nonetheless,
did not take place until the DPP won the presidency in 2000.
Taiwan's democratization occurred rather peacefully and incrementally compared
to other new democracies, 80 but this unique pattern of constitutional change also carries
restrictions on the achievements of constitutional engineering. Like many new democracies in Eastern Europe, Taiwan established a semi-presidential system through a series
of constitutional amendments in the 1990's. The written Constitution, unfortunately,
fails to provide meaningful guidance and adequate mechanisms for the presidential system that works in real politics. 8 ' Like many new democracies in Eastern Europe, Taiwan
also adopted a mixed electoral system for its parliamentary elections. The electoral
engineering in the early 1990s, unfortunately again, did not consider the consequences
of the electoral system seriously, nor did it foresee the subsequent changes in the party
system. Today, Taiwan still faces serious challenges in consolidating its democracy,
many of which resulted from its problematic institutional design.
The current electoral system for Taiwan's Legislature is an unusual form of a "Parallel System," which normally combines List PR and single-member districts as two
separate mechanisms for seat allocation in a single election.82 While Parallel Systems
were popular designs in the 1990s, Taiwan's electoral system is quite unusual in two
respects. First, the district elections are basically held in multi-member districts (MMD)
under the formula of Single Non-Transferable Voting (SNTV).83 Under this system,
78. For a concise overview of Taiwan's constitutional and legal development, see Tay-sheng Wang, The
Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20"h Century: Toward a Liberal and Democratic Country, 11 PAC. RIM
L. &POL'YJ. 531 (2002).
79. The National Assembly was once a representative body responsible for amending the Constitution and
confirming presidential nominations to the Constitutional Court and other two independent constitutional
organs. Following the Constitutional Amendments of 2000, however, the National Assembly transformed
from a permanent establishment into an ad hoc constitutional convention.
80. Two relevant facts mark the uniqueness of Taiwan's transitional experience. First, the KMT successfully retained its political power until the 2000 presidential election. In other words, Taiwan did not follow the
typical path of transitional democracies, in which a regime turnover usually occurs at the outset of democratization. Second, instead of enacting a new constitution, KMT chose to amend the problematic ROC Constitution incrementally. Throughout the 1990s, Taiwan amended the Constitution six times.
81. Many scholars regard Taiwan as a presidential democracy mainly because (1)the popularly elected
President is the actual leader of the executive branch, and (2) the parliamentary mechanism of the "vote of noconfidence" is almost a "mission impossible" under the conditions of Taiwan's electoral politics. See, e.g.,
Jih-wen Lin, Institutionalized Uncertainty and Governing Crises in the Post-Hegemonic Taiwan (2002),
available at http://www.inpr.org.tw/inprc/recent/0607- .pdf.
82. See IDEA HANDBOOK OF ELECTORAL SYsTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 55; Shvetsova, supra note 48,
at 64.
83. This part of the electoral system shows affinity for Japan's old electoral system used before 1996,
though Taiwan's district magnitude-ranging from one to thirteen, with an average of seven-is quite different from its Japanese predecessor. See Andrew J. Nathan, The Legislative Yuan Elections in Taiwan: Conse-
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there are multiple seats in each district, but every voter retains only one vote. The winning candidates in each district are those who receive the most votes. 84 Second, although
there is a separate List PR system for 49 out of 225 seats of the Legislature,85 there is no
separate ballot for political parties. Like a tying arrangement, these seats are allocated
to parties in proportion to the votes their candidates received in district elections, but
only parties whose district candidates obtained more than 5% of the vote can participate
in the allocation of these PR seats.
To a great extent, this unique combination affirmed the path-dependent theory of
institutional evolution. Over the last twelve years, major parties, as well as voters, also
86
learned strategies that helped the system to generate rather proportionate outcomes.
Nonetheless, few people like this system, and almost all parties promise to reform it.
The electoral system is accused of being the principal or accomplice of the following
wrongs that occurred in Taiwan:
(1) Governing crises: Major parties in Taiwan suffer from factionalism because
party cohesiveness and discipline are hard to maintain under the SNTV-MMD system.87
Due to the loose party discipline and the flawed bylaws of the legislature, the legislative
process is often paralyzed by individual representatives, even when the party leaders
have reached agreement on an issue. Before the regime turnover in 2000, the KMT
government relied on clientelism to implement its legislative agendas, but this strategy
exacerbated the vicious circle of money politics and ultimately contributed to the fall of
the KMT government in 2000. The current ruling party, the DPP, finds it less difficult
to maintain party discipline because it is more cohesive than the KMT in terms of political ideology. However, it still fails to control the legislative agenda because it does not
hold a majority of the seats in the legislature.
With the dissolution of the KMT's hegemony, the 2001 legislative election further
vindicated a well-known prophesy of another governing crisis under the SNTV-MMD
system: a fragmented legislature. 88 Since the DPP, along with its ally the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), lacks a legislative majority, and since the opposition coalition
formed by the KMT and its allies are eager to do anything to obstruct the presidential
quences of the Electoral System, 33 ASIAN SURV. 424, 425 (1993).
84. See IDEA HANDBOOK OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 51-52; COx, supra note 37, at
100-01.
85. These 49 seats are further divided into two sub-groups: 41 of them are "National At-Large Representatives" and the remaining eight seats are "Representatives of the Overseas Chinese." They are meant to provide some symbolic representation for the extraterritorial Chinese so as to disguise the birth of Taiwan's
sovereignty as the inevitable result of its democratization.
86. The outcomes of Taiwan's semi-proportional system are rather proportional because major parties
have learned to control their nominations in multi-member districts; they further encourage and coordinate
their supporters to vote strategically so as to avoid the votes being wasted in the election. For discussions of
electoral strategies under the Taiwanese SNTV-MMD system, see Nathan, supra note 83, at 428-37; Eric P.
Moon, Single Non-Transferable Vote Methods in Taiwan in 1996: Effects of an Electoral System, 37 ASIAN
SURV. 652, 656-67 (1997).
87. The SNTV-MMD system is a hotbed of party factionalism because (1) the elections under it tend to be
candidate-centered, and (2) intra-party competition within one district tends to be more intense than inter-party
competition. See Moon, supra note 86, at 667-68; Raymond V. Christensen, The New Japanese Election
System, 69 PAC. AFF. 49, 64-65 (1996); Matthew Soberg Shugart & Stephan Haggard, Institutions and Public
Policy in Presidential Systems, in PRESIDENTS, PARLIAMENTS, AND POLICY 64, 86-88 (Stephan Haggard &
Mathew D. McCubbins, eds., 2001) [hereinafter PRESIDENTS, PARLIAMENTS, AND POLICY].
88. Currently there are six parties (including a constellation of independent representatives) in the Legislative Yuan. Though Taiwan is developing a bi-polar party system under the influence of the winner-take-all
presidential electoral system, the coalitions are instable because parties are reluctant to cooperate in the legislative arena.
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policies, except initiating a "vote of no-confidence", 89 the political situation following
9°
the regime turnover in May 2000 resembles a scenario of "impotent presidentialism."
(2) Polarized and theatrical politics: Compared to the SMD system, Taiwan's
SNTV-MMD system has a much lower electoral threshold on average, owing to its large
district magnitude. This system facilitates the representation of minority groups, but
unfortunately, Taiwan's politics is far from the ideal of consociational democracy.
Moderate candidates often have difficulty competing with militants or fundamentalists,
and incumbent representatives are reluctant to devote themselves to policy research or
serious deliberation, which rarely attract the media's attention. To capture the support
of their constituents, Taiwan's legislators often engage in theatrical behavior such as
fighting or quarreling with their ideological rivals. 91 Although all four major parties in
Taiwan are popular parties eager to gain the support of median voters, the SNTV-MMD
system offers little incentive to political reconciliation but instead encourages the exploitation of social cleavage.
(3) Corruption and money politics: The SNTV-MMD system also plays a large role
in corruption and money politics, a problematic dimension of Taiwan's political development during the last two decades.92 Under the SNTV with high district magnitude,
campaigns tend to be rather expensive because candidates need to cultivate personal
votes to compete with their intra-party rivals. 93 This systematic tendency is further amplified by Taiwan's political transition. In order to entrench its power, from the 1980s
on the KMT relied on the support of "local factions," who are often alleged to hold ties
with organized crime. These local factions win seats in many district elections by votebuying or intimidation; they later satisfy their campaign debt through various rentseeking activities. In addition, under the current electoral system, along with the ineffective campaign finance regulations, big corporations and special interest groups can
easily find their mouthpieces. Consequently, politics in Taiwan is riddled with scandals.
Although, since the regime turnover in 2000, Taiwan's prosecutors wage war against
vote-buying, corruption, and other politics-related criminalities, many people believe
that the vicious circle of money politics cannot be broken without radical reform.
(4) Voter dilemmas: Taiwan's voters are not satisfied with the current electoral system. Under the tying arrangement of the List PR and the district election, a voter cannot
choose a candidate without endorsing the candidate's party at the same time. It remains
difficult for voters to vote for a candidate who belongs to a party they do not appreciate.94 Even if a voter is affiliated with a specific party, he or she will need to decide
which candidate to vote for, especially when the party nominates more than one candi89. The 1997 constitutional amendment created the "vote of no-confidence" mechanism, which may lead
to the dissolution of the Legislative Yuan by the President's discretion. This deadlock-solving mechanism is
ineffective mainly because under the SNTV-MMD system, campaign costs are so high and the odds of the
incumbents are so low that no party wants to assume the risk of unscheduled election; see Jih-wen Lin, supra

note 81, at 15.
90. Aurel Croissant, Electoral System in Asia as Elements of Consensus and MajoritarianDemocracy:
Comparing Seven Cases 1, 25 (2001), available at http://croissant.uni-hd.de/electoral-systems.pdf.
91. Larry Diamond, How DemocraticIsTaiwan? Five Key Challengesfor Democratic Development and
Consolidation 1, 16-17 (2001), availableat http://www.stanford.edu/l-diamond/papers/taiwan.pdf.
92. Id. at 4-8. In Taiwan, people usually speak of "black and gold politics." While "black" refers to the
criminal penetration of politics, "gold" indicates the influence of money politics.
93. See Tun-Jen Cheng & Stephan Haggard, Democracy and Deficits in Taiwan: The Politics of Fiscal
Policy 1986-1996, in PRESIDENTS, PARLIAMENTS, AND POLICY 183, 207.

94. See, e.g., Tzung-jen Tsai, Xuan Ju Zhi Du He Li Hua [Rationalizing the Electoral System] (2002),
available at http://www/advocate.org.tw/ta-research.asp?pname=1901.
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date in the district. For example, voting for a popular candidate may limit the party's
chance to win an additional seat; voting for another candidate of the same party, on the
other hand, may counter his/her preferences and even cause the voter's preferred candidate to lose. 95 Few voters enjoy engaging in strategic calculation, even though it may
contribute to the proportionate election result.
Since the mid-1990s, electoral reform exists as an important issue in Taiwan. In the
1996 National Development Conference, a round-table meeting among party leaders, the
KMT and DPP reached a consensus that the electoral system for the Legislature should
be transformed into a combination of the SMD and List PR systems. However, they
failed to negotiate a detailed proposal. At that time, the KMT preferred a Parallel system that models after the new Japanese electoral system, whereas the DPP favored the
MMP system, which is actually a form of proportional representation. Electoral reform
continued to be an important issue in the 2000 presidential election and the 2001 legislative election; during the 2001 election, there was even a popular movement requiring
electoral reform and downsizing the Legislature. Although all the major parties pledged
to support the idea of "SMD and a separate ballot for List PR," the disagreements over
the reform proposal still persist. In May 2002, the Presidential Commission on Reforming Government (PCRG) passed a resolution, suggesting that the current electoral system be transformed into a Japanese-style Parallel System. 96 This proposal coincided
with the KMT's previous preference, but this time the KMT and its new ally People
First Party (PFP) refused to endorse it, probably because they feared that the proposed
reform would give the DPP political credits as well as "seat bonuses." Again, electoral
reform achieved little progress even though the public supported it.
Skepticism about the likelihood of electoral reform is warranted since any reform
proposal that aims to abolish the SNTV-MMD system requires constitutional change, a
very difficult process that cannot succeed without support of the major parties.97 To
press the opposition-controlled legislature to implement reform, the DPP government
planned to hold an advisory referendum. This motion was ruled out by the end of 2003
because the newly enacted Referendum Act forbids the executive branch to sponsor any
referendum except for the so-called "preventive referendum." The failure to appear on
the referendum ballot in the 2004 presidential election did not dampen the hope for electoral reform, for both of the "Pan-Blue" (KMT and PFP) and "Pan-Green" (DPP and
TSU) coalitions pledged to undertake comprehensive constitutional engineering in the
near future. While serious disputes exist over the format and timetable of the proposed
constitutional changes, there is no doubt that electoral reform will be a major issue in
Taiwan.

95. See Nathan, supra note 83, at 433-35.
96. According to the Commission's proposal, the seats of the Legislative Yuan will be reduced from 225
to 150, in which 90 members will be elected through single-member districts and 60 through list-PR system;
each voter may cast two ballots, one for the district-election and one for the party lists.
97. There are also reform proposals (such as reducing the district magnitude and creating a separate ballot
for the list PR) for which a constitutional amendment is not needed. But since such compromised proposals
would still maintain the problematic SNTV-MMD system, many people wonder whether they can improve
Taiwan's electoral politics significantly.
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C. Basic Concerns of ElectoralEngineering

The United States and Taiwan cases demonstrate some interesting contrasts: while
proponents of electoral reform in the United States seek to change the dominant singlemember congressional districts into multi-member districts, reformers in Taiwan want to
get rid of MMDs and instead use SMDs in district-elections; while the reform advocates
in the United States hope to breathe life into static politics by increasing the proportionality of the congressional electoral system, electoral engineers in Taiwan want to decrease the electoral proportionality of legislative elections to enhance political stability
and maintain social harmony. 98 The arguments against the proposed electoral reforms in
these two countries present a symmetrical contrast as well: Opponents of the PR movement in the United States worry that adopting the proposed semi-proportional electoral
system will exacerbate the "balkanization" of American politics and endanger the political stability of its presidential democracy; 99 some political scientists in Taiwan, on the
other hand, contend that proportional representation is a merit in its own right and that
the MMP system is a better alternative for Taiwan's electoral reform.100
The discourse of electoral reforms in these two countries, therefore, reveals some
mutual concerns of electoral design that are easy to discern especially when we observe
the deliberations from the perspective of institutional engineering. These mutual concerns can be summarized into two words: "governability" and "representativeness."''
As the literature review in the Part I indicates, scholars often emphasize different concerns over electoral engineering: people oppose the combination of proportional representation and presidential democracies because of anxieties over governability. Those
who support the PR movement in presidential democracies, on the other hand, think
highly of full and fair representation. Could either of these two concerns resolve the
heated disputes over electoral engineering? If trade-offs are inevitable, how should we
balance the competing values and objectives?
Ill. CONCERNS OF GOVERNABILITY
The most common criticism of proportional representation is that PR tends to produce several governance problems such as balkanized politics, unstable coalitions, and
excessive gridlock. 10 2 Using the Weimar Republic, Italy, and Israel as examples, critics
98. Some political scientists predict that the proposed parallel system would be less proportional than the
current electoral system for Taiwan's Legislature; see Yung-ming Hsu, Dan Yi Xuan Qu Liang Piao Zhi Zheng
Zhi Chong Ji De Mo Ni [Assessing the Political Impacts of the Proposed Parallel Electoral System], in XIN
SHI JI XIN XIAN ZHENG:

XIAN ZHENG YAN TAO HUI LUN WEN JI [NEW CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE

POLITICS] 467, 481-83 (LungChu Chen ed., 2002).
99. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 14, at n.53.
100. See, e.g., Yeh-lih Wang, Zai Zao Xian Zheng Yun Zuo De Li Xiang Huan Jing: Xuan Ju Zhi Du, Guo
Hui Yun Zuo Yu Zheng Dang Xie Shang Ji Zhi De Gai Ge Chu Yi [Toward an Ideal Environment of Constitutional Politics: Reform Proposalsfor the ElectoralSystem, Bylaws of the Legislature and the Mechanisms of
Inter-Party Negotiation], in XIN SHI JI XIN XIAN ZHENG: XIAN ZHENG YAN TAO HUt LUN WEN JI [NEW
NEW CENTURY: A COLLECTION OF SYMPOSIUM PAPERS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
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SYMPOSIUM

PAPERS
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CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS] 331, 340-44 (Lung-Chu Chen ed., 2002).
101. See Larry Diamond, Three Paradoxesof Democracy, in THE GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY
95, 100-03 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1993); THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supranote 2, at 1160
(indicating that "[r]epresentation versus effectiveness are the fundamental lines along which the battle is

usually drawn").
102. See Douglas J.

Amy, Common Criticisms of PR and Responses to Them, available at
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of PR often argue that its potential threats to the sustainable development of democracy
should outweigh whatever advantages it may hold.10 3 On the other hand, proponents of
PR say that this argument is an exaggeration. Given that PR tends to encourage multipartism, they contend that the fragmentation of the party system can be tamed by introducing a higher (3-5%) threshold of exclusion.1 4 The fact that many European countries enjoyed stable democracy and effective governance under this brand of electoral
system empowers PR advocates to maintain that instability is not a common problem. 105
Their forceful cross-examination further indicates that even the rise of the Nazis-the
the anti-PR camp--had little to do with the PR system
most dramatic case presented 0by
6
Republic.
Weimar
the
used in
From the perspective of constitutional engineering, it appears that both sides of this
debate miss one crucial point: the constitutional framework in which the electoral system operates. Proponents of PR are correct to challenge the general criticism that PR
tends to destabilize the political system. However, this assertion is doubtful not only
because minor changes in institutional details may result in different consequences,' 0 7
but also because the institutional and cultural contexts of electoral systems vary significantly.10 8 "Electoral systems do not work in a vacuum," a handbook of electoral design
reminds us. °9 To ascertain the political consequence of PR, accordingly, we need to
consider various contextual factors.
Other things being equal, does PR contain different consequences in different types
of constitutional systems? Probably all constitutional engineers would answer "yes".
Disagreement ensues when we try to specify the differences and their implications. For
many constitutional engineers, PR is hardly compatible with the presidential system.
The mixture of these two systems is often condemned as the worst constitutional design,
for PR would pose serious threats to the governability of presidential democracy. Based
on the comparative studies of the unstable democracies in Latin America, this viewpoint
becomes the orthodoxy of constitutional engineering. Among its supporters we find
Professors Lijphart and Ackerman," 0 two leading scholars in comparative politics and
constitutional law respectively, even though both are rather sympathetic to the egalitarian ideal of proportional representation.11' However, Professors Guinier and Amy-two
leading advocates of the PR movement in the United States-believe the opposite.
While acknowledging that government instability may be an issue for countries using
parliamentary and PR systems, they argue that this would not be the case in a presidenhttp://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/articles/common criticisms of..pr.htm.
103. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of PresidentialGovernment: Why ProfessorAckerman Is
Wrong to Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51, 59-66 (2001).
104. See Guinier, The Lessons of Bush v. Gore, supra note 69, at 258-59.
105. See Douglas J.
Amy, Common Criticisms of PR and Responses to Them, available at
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/articles/common-criticisms-oLpr.htm.
106. See Guinier, The Lessons of Bush v. Gore, supra note 69, at 258.
107. See Guinier, The Lessons of Bush v. Gore, supra note 69, at 259 (noting that "instituting a five percent threshold of exclusion would reduce the number of parties in [Israel's] current legislature from fifteen to
seven").
108. See id. at 259. In discussing the case of Israel, Professor Guinier also mentions the religious background of Israeli politics.
109. See IDEA HANDBOOK OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN, supra note 5, at 122.
110. See Nohlen, supra note 6, at 49 (citing Lijphart's paper in a German book that ranks the combination
of PR and presidential system as the least efficient form of democracy); Ackerman, supra note 14, at 656-57.
111. See Arend Lijphart, The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF
DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 52; Ackerman, supra note 14, at 657.
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tial system because changes of legislative coalition carries no impact on government
formation under the separation-of-power framework.1 12 Professor Cheibub's empirical
research further challenges the conventional wisdom. Based on his quantitative analysis, Professor Cheibub launches a vigorous attack on the validity of the conventional
theory. 113
Should we trust the conventional wisdom of constitutional engineering and reject
the proposals of increasing electoral proportionality in presidential democracies? Or
should we embrace a combination of PR and presidential system that is intuitively appealing for many people?" 4 Focusing on the concerns over governability, this part examines the controversy over the compatibility of the PR and presidential systems. By
clarifying and reexamining the factual assumptions and value judgments inherent in the
concerns of governability, I argue that neither the conventional thesis that opposes this
combination nor the minority opinion that supports the marriage is decisive on this issue. Accordingly, we should make a more empirical and pragmatic inquiry when assessing the proposals of electoral reform in the United States and Taiwan. Increasing
electoral proportionality does not necessarily endanger the survival of presidential democracy, nor will a semi-proportional compromise necessarily alleviate the worry of
govemability. Before we make this judgment, however, we must first review both sides
of the debate.
A. The Linzian Nightmare
The conventional wisdom that the combination of PR and presidential system is
highly problematic derives from the comparative studies of presidential democracies in
Latin America. Beginning in the 1970s, Professor Linz, a well-known political scientist
specializing in studies of democracy, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism, began to
explore the failure of democracy in Latin America. Professor Linz and his followers
attributed the numerous constitutional breakdowns in Latin America to the design and
performance of constitutional institutions per se."15 According to them, the fact that
most countries in Latin America adopted a presidential system with PR was not merely a
coincidence; it revealed the root of the problem." 6 Professor Linz later warned of the
perils of presidentialism.' 7 Although Professor Linz's criticism focuses on the structure
and logic of the presidential system, he also notes that his conclusion "applies especially
to nations with deep political cleavages and numerous political parties."" 8 Whether the
parliamentary system is more conducive to stable democracy than the presidential sys-

112. See Douglas J.

Amy, Common

Criticisms of PR and Responses to Them, available at

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/articles/common criticismsofpr.htm;

LANI GUINIER,
EVERY VOICE: TURNING A CIVIL RIGHTS SETBACK INTO A NEW VISION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 263 (1998).

LIFT

113. See Jose Antonio Cheibub, Presidentialismand DemocraticPerformance, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF
DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 104.
114. See Carey, supra note 26, at 94 ("If the executive and legislative branches of government fulfill different functions--the former, for example, representing a broad national policy agenda and the latter representing the diversity of society-this characteristic may be intuitively appealing.") Professor Jones also argues
that presidential government combined with PR can be an ideal type of presidentialism as long as the electoral
rules merely encourage moderate multipartism. See JONES, supra note 26, at 80-81.
115. See THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at ix-xiv.
116. Nohlen, supra note 6, at 48-49.
117. Linz, supra note 9, at 3.
118. Linz, supra note 13, at 109.
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tem-the major question raised by Professor Linz's seminal work-is an issue of endless debate, but his observations regarding the tension between multipartisan and presidentialism now seems to be conventional wisdom." 9 In this regard, the combination of
PR and presidential system is especially problematic because PR appears to contribute
to the formation of multi-party system.
In honor of Professor Linz's contribution, Professor Ackerman labels the scenario
of constitutional breakdown that may happen in the presidential system the "Linzian
nightmare."'' 20 According to Professor Ackerman, this worst-case scenario of presidential democracy "is most likely to occur when proportional representation generates five
or six or more parties in the congress."' 121 Even though PR does not necessarily cause the
constitutional breakdown of a presidential democracy, it may nonetheless invite crises in
governability. 122 But why is a presidential democracy vulnerable to the threat of constitutional breakdown, especially when it uses PR to conduct legislative elections? What
crises does PR in presidential democracies actually invite? From the current literature
we find two explanations: one emphasizes problems of impasse and the other stresses
the danger of a weak legislature.
1. The Crisis of Impasse
The presidential system is built upon a power structure of dual democratic legitimacy: both the president and the assembly are popularly elected and both can claim to
be the representative of the people. 23 These two political branches might work together
with one heart. But what if they don't? Consider Professor Ackerman's description of
the crisis in govemability:
[riather than all out war, president and house may merely indulge a taste for endless
backbiting, mutual recrimination, and partisan deadlock. Worse yet, the contending
powers may use the constitutional tools at their disposal to make life miserable for
each other: the house will harass the executive, and the president will engage in uni124
lateral action whenever he can get away with it.
Certainly, this is a common problem faced by all presidential democracies, but one
may argue that the combination of PR and presidential system can exacerbate the crisis.
First of all, since PR tends to encourage multipartism, it increases the likelihood of divided government. 125 If the president's party cannot control a majority of seats in the
assembly, the president would need to rely on coalitions or cross-party alliances to pursue his/her political agendas. Unfortunately, it is rather difficult for the president to
form or maintain a stable ruling coalition because there is no strong incentive for coali-

119. See, e.g., Mainwaring & Shugart, supra note 18, at 1-2; JONES, supra note 26, at 78-79.
120. Ackerman, supra note 14, at 645. The other two scenarios identified by Professor Ackerman are
"Madisonian hope" and "crisis in governability." Id. at 645-47.
121. Id. at 656.
122. Id. at 647.
123. THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 6-7; see also SHUGART & CAREY,
PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES, supra note 11, at 32-33.
124. Ackerman, supra note 14, at 647.
125. See Cheibub, supra note 113, at 110 (confirming that "divided government is more frequent when
legislative elections are held under proportional representation system").
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tion building in the presidential system.'1 6 In certain circumstances, the president may
try hard to make deals with individual legislators to form cross-party alliances, but
he/she would work in vain if parties have rigid discipline. 27 Meanwhile, it would be
more difficult for opposition parties in the assembly to form and maintain their legislative coalitions, especially when parties have different ideological positions and when
their faithful supporters dislike political compromises. 28 In this scenario, the closed listPR system also heightens the difficulties of divided government because it tends to enhance the discipline and ideological cohesiveness of political parties.
If political actors cannot overcome these difficulties, a presidential democracy will
suffer from government paralysis, endless deadlock, or even chaos. Professor Ackerman further indicates that the Linzian nightmare is more likely to materialize under
these circumstances, for dissatisfied actors may be prompted to seek extra-constitutional
solutions (such as military coup d'etat). 29 This scenario is conceivable, but to confirm
the causation between divided government, deadlock, and constitutional breakdown,
more empirical findings of comparative politics are required.
2. The Crisis of Weak Legislature
The second explartation prompts us to consider a deeper tension between multipartism and presidentialism; it suggests that even in the absence of deadlock, a multi-party
presidential democracy is still vulnerable to the disastrous constitutional breakdown.
This scenario is weaved in Professor Ackerman's illustration of "crisis in governability"
when he notes that "[i]ncreasingly, the house is reduced to a forum for demagogic posturing, while the president makes the tough decisions unilaterally without considering
30
the interests and ideologies represented by the leading political parties in congress."'
Later Professor Calabresi elaborates on this, emphasizing that multipartism jeopardizes
a presidential democracy mainly because it can weaken and fragment the legislative
leadership.' 3' To illustrate the crisis of a weak legislature stemming from the adoption of
PR, Professor Calabresi poses an interesting hypothesis:
[n]ow imagine that we had proportional representation in the House of Representatives. Instead of facing a powerful Republican and Democratic Party leader, President Clinton might have faced a House with a leader from: the Christian Coalition,
the Libertarian Party, an African-American Party, the Social-Democratic Party, the
Business Roundtable Party, the Ku Klux Klan Party, the Green Party, and the Labor
Party. Such a fragmented party leadership would carry little leverage with President
Clinton and so the presidency would have become incomparably more powerful.
This is the dynamic that in fact plays out now in many Latin American countries that
combine presidentialism with proportional representation, and it is a dynamic that has

126. See Mainwaring & Shugart, supra note 18; JONES, supra note 26, at 6-8.
127. See, Mainwaring & Shugart, Conclusion, supra note 23, at 420-21.
128. For a vivid explanation of why it might be difficult to achieve political compromise under the conditions of polarized society and proportional representation, see Horowitz, supra note 7, at 20-25.
129. See Ackerman, supra note 14, at 656.
130. Id. at 647.
131. See Calabresi, supra note 103, at 79.
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contributed to democratic breakdown through presidentially-led coups in some of
those countries.

132

Based on his commitment to presidentialism, Professor Calabresi argues that the
use of PR in legislative elections is incompatible with the presidential system not only
because multipartism-the presumed consequence of PR-is inconsistent with the "nonideological nature of presidentialism,"' 33 but also because a fragmented legislature may
be too weak to act as a check and balance to the powerful presidency, and thus open the
doors to constitutional breakdown.134 The rationale of this scenario is understandable in
light of the historical experiences of some Latin American countries, but this explanation has not been fully elaborated upon. For instance, it is less clear why we can measure the strength of a legislature based on the degree of its fragmentation; whether multipartism per se has miserable impacts on the survival of a presidential democracy also
requires closer examination.
B. Alternative Theories
Mainstream constitutional engineers seem to believe that the combination of PR and
presidential system is a bad idea. But some scholars refuse to echo the majority view.
These scholars share the view that PR is not incompatible with the presidential system
per se, although they take different positions on the issue of desirability and use different strategies to argue their cases. In this section, I categorize the alternative theories
into two schools: one reflects optimism with respect to the prospect of PR in presidential
democracies, and the other reflects skepticism toward the conventional assertion.
1. Optimists' Viewpoints
In contrast to the prevailing fear of the Linzian nightmare, some scholars take a
more positive attitude toward the use of PR in presidential democracies. They either
contend that there is far less need to worry about the destabilizing effects of PR in the
context of the presidential system, or believe that its impacts on constitutional politics
are manageable. Professor Guinier incorporates these two positions when arguing for
the transition to PR in the United States. In response to the general fear of proportional
representation, she first builds her case on the structural differences between the parliamentary and presidential systems. While admitting that the fear is "at least relevant in a
parliamentary system in which the elections to the national legislature determine the
composition of the executive branch," Professor Guinier contends that "the specter of
balkanization is much less persuasive when considering elections whose only purpose is
to determine the membership of an exclusively legislative body such as our Congress."

135

Certainly, the legislative elections in presidential system have no direct impacts on
government (cabinet) formation. The inference that PR would be less troublesome in
132. Id.
133. Id. at 79. Professor Calabresi argues that presidential system tends to be non-ideological or even antiideological; see id. at 78-85.
134. Id. at 79-80.
135. GUINIER, supra note 112, at 263.
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the context of a presidential democracy, however, presupposes that government formation is the major conduit through which PR exerts its influences on governability; without this assumption, we can only claim that the impacts of PR on a presidential system
may be different from its impacts on a parliamentary system. This implied assumption
is the main weakness of this argument, because it is contrary to the findings of comparative politics. Professor Guinier is right in refuting the "general" fear of balkanization as
nightmare speapplied to presidential democracy, but she does not address the haunting
36
cific to this institutional context. This neglect weakens her argument. 1
The case for using PR in a presidential democracy, nonetheless, should not be
summarily dismissed since Professor Guinier and some political scientists advance another argument that seems to be more cogent. In a later book, Professors Guinier and
Torres recognize the flip side of the quest for proportional representation:
[h]igher rates of participation, more robust forms of debate, and greater minority representation can themselves become barriers to efficient decision-making. Proportional representation would lower the bar to successful cross-constituency and multiracial coalition organizing, but even with proportional representation it would still be
essential to fight fragmentation and to aggregate, rotate, and share power among progressive interests in a lasting and sustainable way in order to realize a fully democ37
ratic movement.1
This remark signals another optimists' message: even though PR may create some
problems, the risks can still be managed. Several prophylactic measures have been suggested by the current literature. For example, to restrict the fragmentation of party system, we can decrease the electoral proportionality of legislative elections by imposing a
higher electoral threshold (threshold of exclusion), lowering the district magnitude, or
simply choosing a semi-proportional system. Some political scientists also suggest that
the combination of PR and presidential system would function better if the presidential
and legislative elections are held concurrently and/or if the presidential elections are
based on the plurality formula. 13 Generally speaking, this proposal appears sound. It
takes the concerns of governability more seriously and promises to reconcile multipartism with presidentialism. But since this position presumes that all that is needed is to
avoid excessive fragmentation of the party system, its persuasiveness depends on
whether (1) the balkanization can be deterred effectively by the proposed electoral engineering, and (2) crises in governability will be reduced if PR merely generates a moderate multi-party system. The first proposition seems to be supported by comparative
politics studies; the validity of the second proposition, however, looks quite dubious in
1 39
light of Professor Cheibub's statistical analysis introduced below.
136. See Ackerman, supra note 14, at 657 n.53.
137. GuINIER & TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY, supra note 56, at 212.
138. This is because the shape of the party system may also be influenced by the institutional designs of the
presidential elections and the "electoral cycle," which means the relative timing of the presidential and legislative elections. Professors Shugart and Carey suggest that a concurrent or a honeymoon electoral cycle is more
likely to generate a unified government or increase legislative support for the president; they also argue that
the plurality election of the presidency tends to induce two-bloc competition. See SHUGART & CAREY,
PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES, supra note 11, at 224-25, 257-58.
139. See Cheibub, supra note 113, at 123-24 (suggesting that "[i]n presidential democracies high risks are
associated with situations of very low pluralism, or situations conducive to moderate pluralism, which as
Sartori suggested, are the ones in which there are between 2 and 5 relevant political parties").
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2. Skeptics' Perspectives
We are told that PR in a presidential democracy tends to produce divided governments and ceaseless deadlocks between the two political branches, which ultimately
might lead to constitutional breakdown. We are also told that it is necessary to fight
against the excessive fragmentation of the party system, which is extremely dangerous
for the survival of a presidential democracy. These arguments sound rational, but a
skeptic would urge us to take a critical stand on these causal propositions unless they
have been proved by sufficient and compelling evidence. If this skeptical position is
grounded in empirical research, it is not a cheap shot that can be easily dismissed.
Professor Cheibub leads us "to reconsider the causal mechanisms that are allegedly
responsible for presidentialism's relatively poor performance." 14° Based on the quantitative data for all presidential and semi-presidential regimes from 1946 to 1996, Professor
Cheibub's research points out several fallacies prevailed in the current literature. First,
although it is true that the use of PR in legislative elections, the non-concurrent electoral
cycle, and the multiplication of the effective numbers of parties tend to increase the
likelihood of divided government, 14 "neither divided government nor the factors that
make it more likely to occur affect the probability that deadlock situations will occur.
And, most importantly, neither divided government nor deadlock affect[s] negatively the
longevity of presidential regimes or the survival in office of presidents and their parties."' 14 2 In this regard, Professor Ackerman's scenario that the crisis of impasse will
eventually lead to a constitutional breakdown is not supported by Professor Cheibub's
statistical data.
Secondly, Professor Cheibub indicates that multipartism per se does not affect the
survival of presidential regimes. Contrary to the prevalent favor on moderate multiparty systems (where the effective number of legislative parties is about 3.5),143 Professor Cheibub finds that the survival of presidential democracies is strongly affected by
the existence of moderate pluralism,'" especially when there are "three political forces
of relatively equal strength, each of which is attempting to implement its own programme either alone or in alternating coalitions.- 145 In another paper, Professor Cheibub
further indicates that government coalitions are more likely to occur when the legislature
is more fractionalized. 146 In this regard, the widespread fear that the excessive fragmentation of a party system is extremely harmful to the prospect of presidential democracy
is also unwarranted.
For those who believe statistics, Professor Cheibub's research probably has thrown
the conventional scenarios into the shade. But do they force us to conclude that our
concerns about the compatibility of PR and the presidential system are nothing but
groundless fears? Maybe they do not. After all, not all crises in governability can be
140. Id. at 105.
141. See id. at 106-10.
142. Id. at 132.
143. See Mainwaring & Shugart, Conclusion, supra note 23, at 398-99.
144. See Cheibub, supra note 113, at 123-24.
145. Id. at 124. Professor Cheibub suggests that moderate pluralism is problematic probably because
political compromises may be difficult to maintain under this circumstance.
146. See Jose Antonio Cheibub et. al., Government Coalitions and Legislative Effectiveness under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, Address at the Council on Latin American and Iberian Studies at Yale University Conference 12 (March 22, 2002), availableat http://www.yale.edulas/conference/papers/cheibub.pdf.
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measured quantitatively, and the absence of deadlock in its strict sense does not mean
that tension does not exist between the two political branches. 147 Professor Cheibub and
his colleagues conclude that "Linz ...must be right that something is wrong with presidentialism, but we have not been very successful in discovering which of his hundred
reasons is the real one."'14 8 Maybe their difficulty in ascertaining the "real reason" has
something to do with the approach they take.
C. Beyond the Nightmare
After reviewing both sides of the story, it is time to make our own judgment on the
compatibility of PR and the presidential system. We may find that conventional wisdom
provides persuasive explanations for certain Latin American cases, but its validity as a
general theorem is seriously challenged by empirical-quantitative research. We may
also conclude that some engineers' positive attitudes are admirable, but they cannot
guarantee that the proposed electoral engineering could effectively eliminate or alleviate
the hazards of govemability. Recognizing the controversies and uncertainties, however,
does not relieve us of a tough judgment. We still need to decide whether concerns of
govemability shall prevent us from pursuing the ideal of proportional representation in
presidential democracies, especially in the contexts of the United States and Taiwan.
1. Reflections on General Theory
To begin with, we need to clarify the factual or causal assumptions upon which our
value judgment is based. It is safe to say that the multi-party system is more likely to
come into being if PR is used in legislative elections. But electoral proportionality is
merely one of the contributing factors in the formation of party systems; without considering other institutional and non-institutional variables, we simply cannot predict how
many parties will acquire seats in the legislature. 149 In other words, multipartism is too
general a concept to inform us how fragmented the party system could be if we increase
the proportionality of legislative elections; to identify the kind of multi-party system PR
might bring about, a more context-specific analysis is required.
We may also presume that PR will encourage the emergence of ideological and disciplined parties because elections under PR tend to be more issue-oriented, 150 and because parties will have more authority to nominate candidates especially when the
closed-list PR system is used. However, it is rather difficult to pin down the impacts of
disciplined parties on the presidential system. Professors Mainwaring and Shugart hypothesize that (1) weak party discipline makes it difficult to establish and maintain stable coalitions, and that (2) rigid party discipline also makes it difficult for the president

147. When assessing the deadlock situations, Professor Cheibub defines "deadlock" in a very rigid sense:
"conditions for deadlock are present only if the president is likely to veto a bill and the opposition does not
have enough votes to override the presidential veto." Cheibub, supra note 113, at 111. Therefore, one may
argue that his assessment does not capture all the crises of impasse.
148. Cheibub et.
al., supra note 146, at 15.
149. Professors Shugart and Haggard even suggest that "the degree of proportionality of elections has
much less. . . effect on the number of parties in presidential than in parliamentary systems." See Shugart &
Haggard, supra note 87, at 90.
150. See GUINIER & TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY, supra note 56, at 210; Shugart & Haggard, supra
note 87, at 85-88.
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to form cross-party alliances. 15 1 Given that these two hypotheses are correct, it is still
hard to predict or measure the degree of party discipline PR might create.' 5 2 After all,
party discipline or party cohesiveness is a fluid concept; a weak party may act cohesively in certain occasions, whereas a strong party will not act unanimously all the time.
In any event, the multi-party system does tend to increase the frequency of divided
government, which usually refers to the situation in which a single party does not control the presidency and the legislature. 53 Since there are many parties playing in the
political process and since each party tends to act ideologically and cohesively, it seems
reasonable to presume that the divided government resulting from multipartism will
incur significant transaction costs in making policies; that the policy process will be
154
slower and less decisive under this circumstance is also a reasonable expectation.
These conditions may affect the policy outcomes significantly, but what intensifies concerns of governability is mainly the potential stalemate or partisan warfare between the
two political branches. Given that the presidential system is more vulnerable to deadlock situations than the parliamentary system because of its separation-of-power structure, many people worry that the president or the legislature might act unilaterally or
seek exceptional (even extra-constitutional) measures to break gridlock. 155 Certainly,
constitutional democracy is in great peril if political actors no longer play by the rules,
but such a worrisome situation is not inevitable. Whether crisis of impasse or weak
legislature will occur, in fact, further depends on many factors, such as the political
culture, constitutional provisions regarding presidential and legislative powers, ideological proximity of parties, and the distribution of seats in the legislature. The complexity
of causation also explains why divided government and gridlock in presidential democracies do not necessarily lead to constitutional breakdowns.
When explaining his judgment that PR is incompatible with the presidential system,
Professor Calabresi wrote, 'The costs of democratic breakdown are so high and the
comparative benefits of a multi-party system so low that I cannot imagine the risk being
worth taking."' 156 This remark reveals a common sentiment shared by many conventional
engineers that democracy is too fragile to withstand any risky experiment. But even if
we accept such a conservative attitude toward democracy, the conventional thesis is still
questionable because it is based on a dubious assumption that the multipartism itself
endangers the survival of a presidential democracy. Without considering other institutional and non-institutional factors in a given society, we simply cannot tell the vulnerability of a democracy, nor can we predict the seriousness of the threat of constitutional
breakdown. The conventional thesis arguing that PR is incompatible with the presidential system is surely a powerful rhetoric, but just like other rhetoric, it suffers from oversimplification.

151. See Mainwaring & Shugart, Conclusion, supra note 23, at 418-21.
152. Professor Cheibub also argues that party discipline is a behavioral concept and cannot be inferred
from electoral and partisan legislation. See Cheibub, supra note 113, at 118.
153. For an introduction to the concept of divided government, see Robert Elgie, What is Divided Government?, in DIVIDED GOVERNMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (Robert Elgie ed. 2001).
154. See Gary W. Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Institutional Detriments of Economic Policy Outcomes, in PRESIDENTS, PARLIAMENTS, AND POLICY 21, 26-27; Shugart & Haggard, supra note 87, at 95-97.
155. See Shugart & Haggard, supra note 87, at 95-96; Cox & McCubbins, supra note 154, at 29-30;
Robert Elgie, Divided Government in ComparativePerspective, in DIVIDED GOVERNMENT INCOMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 209, 223-24.

156. Calabresi, supra note 103, at 76.
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Nonetheless, the conventional wisdom which envisions crises in govemability can
still be construed as a fair warning. We should not neglect the difficulties of building
and sustaining coalitions that are crucial to effective policymaking during periods of
divided government, nor should we underestimate the ill effects of chronic confrontations between the president and the assembly. Whether such concerns would counsel
for or against the use of PR in a presidential democracy is yet another question that calls
for our value judgment. For those who prefer the value of decisive and effective government, the combination of PR and a presidential system is probably not a good idea
because it tends to breed divided government. For those who appreciate the substantial
checks and balances between governmental branches, the inconvenience of divided
government resulting from the use of PR is to a great extent durable. Reasonable disagreements are inevitable, but we should be able to achieve informed decisions through
a more candid deliberation.
2. Reflections on Cases of the United States and Taiwan
Once we transcend the Linzian nightmare, we can review the proposals of electoral
reform in the United States and Taiwan in more pragmatic terms. From a comparative
perspective, I think American democracy is strong enough to sustain the electoral reform toward proportional representation; the fear of constitutional breakdown is simply
too remote to thwart the reformers' aspiration. Certainly, a more proportionate electoral
system for Congress will foster the fragmentation of the party system, but the party system of the United States will remain a bi-polar one due to the strong effect of presidential elections. 157 The qualitative transformation of politics envisioned by the current
literature, ironically, is also limited or ambiguous: if a semi-proportional system under
the multi-member districts is used, electoral politics in the United States will continue to
be candidate-centered and not issue-oriented in a strict sense; consequently, party discipline will remain weak under these circumstances. Regardless of the impacts that have
not been fully clarified, the proposed PR reform does create challenges of governability.
Whether such reform that will normalize divided government is worth taking is a judgment call that awaits the electoral engineers and the United States public.
Taiwan is a different story. In a society where authoritarian rulers still enjoy higher
popularity than democratic leaders, and in a society where the thrust of nationalism
overshadows commitment to liberal democracy, constitutional breakdown seems to be a
real threat. But throughout the 1990s, political actors in Taiwan did not take the teaching of the Linzian nightmare seriously when engineering Taiwan's young democracy;
they thought a semi-presidential system could integrate a popularly-elected president
with an assembly reflecting divergent interests in the society. 158 The endless partisan
warfare following the first regime turnover in 2000 appears to prove Professor Ackerman's prophecy. The tension between the two political branches is hard to resolve;
157. This prediction is premised on the condition that presidential elections are still governed by the plurality formula; if the majority runoff or instant runoff system is used in presidential elections, the presidential
elections will have less restrictive effect on the fragmentation of party system. See also TODD DONOVAN &
SHAUN BOWLER, REFORMING THE REPUBLIC: DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS FOR THE NEW AMERICA 69 (2004).

158. See Wen-Chen Chang, Xian Zheng Zhu Yi Yu Xuan Ju Zhi Du: "Xin Guo Hui" Xuan Zhi Gai Ge Chu
Yi [Constitutionalismand ElectoralSystem: Designing a New Parliamentfor Post-TransitionTaiwan], in XIN
SHI JI XIN XIAN ZHENG: XAN ZHENG YAN TAO Hui LUN WEN JI [NEW CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE
NEW CENTURY: A COLLECTION OF SYMPOSIUM PAPERS ON CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS] 485, 496-97.
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however, it is not likely that Taiwan will switch into a parliamentary democracy in the
near future, nor is it possible to change the current electoral system for the Legislature
into a plurality-majority one. 159 Now, people in Taiwan can only count on careful electoral engineering to prevent crisis in governability by reducing the possibility of a divided government.
Concerns of governability help us to understand why Taiwan's Presidential Commission on Reforming Government proposes a Japanese-style parallel system, a semiproportional system which is arguably less proportionate than the current SNTV-MMD
system. The necessity of reducing electoral proportionality of the legislative elections,
however, has not been fully justified. Given the strong effect of presidential elections
on the formation of a party system, one can argue that adjusting the electoral cycles to
have concurrent elections is a more effective and less restrictive alternative in fostering
the occurrence of unitary government. Since the PCRG also suggests that presidential
elections and legislative elections be held concurrently to save some social costs, maybe
the electoral engineers intend to have a double insurance in this regard. Unfortunately,
the proposed electoral system still runs the risk of moderate multipartism, a problematic
situation in Professor Cheibub's accounts. It seems that no matter how thoughtful we
are, electoral engineering is doomed to have limitations.
IV.

CONCERNS OF REPRESENTATIVENESS

In the grand debate over the choice of electoral systems, virtually every one admits
that PR is "fairer" to citizens than majoritarian representation. 16 The comparative fairness of PR is evident in the analytical framework introduced by Professor Beitz:
whereas both PR and majoritarian representation satisfy the basic procedural requirement of political equality when they confer on each voter an "equal power" to cast his or
her vote, only PR satisfies the vision of "equal prospects of electoral success" by assuring that nearly every voter will have "an equal chance of voting for a winning candidate,
regardless of the distribution of preferences in the electorate."' 16 1 The phrase "equal
prospects of electoral success" may sound abstruse, but electoral minorities can easily
discern its significance: In a PR system, electoral minorities can be represented by representatives of their choice; in a majoritarian system, by contrast, they can only be represented in a supposititious sense by representatives whom they did not vote for.
Many PR proponents further argue that the proportionality principle is a normative
imperative of political equality, the very foundation of democracy. Mill, for example,
claims that "[ilt is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be adequately
represented. No real democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible
without it.' ' 162 Though Mill's endorsement of PR is largely driven by his elitist sentiment, he makes his argument delicately in egalitarian terms. The libertarian ideal of
self-government also prompts Mill to question whether it is legitimate for "one part of
the people [to] rule over the rest." 163 Professor Christiano's work is a more recent in159. Due to the path-dependence of the electoral reform, the plurality-majority system is simply not a
feasible alternative in Taiwan; see Yung-ming Hsu, supra note 98, at 469-70.
160. ROBERTA. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 100-01 (2001).
161. CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY 133 (1989).
162. JOHN STUART MILL, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 135 (1998).

163. Id. at 131.
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stance of the theoretical efforts to justify the proportionality principle as an integral part
of representative democracy. While admitting that political equality should be construed as a procedural requirement of collective decision-making, as opposed to an outcome-oriented requirement, Professor Christiano asserts that Professor Beize is mistaken
in suggesting that PR only equalizes the prospects of electoral success.164 Viewing the
process of collective decision-making in the modem representative democracy as a twostage process consisting of the election and legislative phases, Professor Christiano argues that only PR can ensure equality "in the overall process" because only PR can (1)
comply with the requirement of anonymity in the distribution of voting power and (2)
65
ensure the egalitarian decision-making of the assembly.'
Justifying proportional representation as an imperative for democracy or political
equality is certainly a tempting approach for PR advocates to present their case. But
even if we are not agnostics, we still need to be cautious with any claim of the moral
truth. Mill's argument is problematic because it is based on the distrust of the majority
rule itself. 166 Doubtless, a central objective of traditional constitutionalism is to prevent
the tyranny of the majority, but whether we need to do so is a question that can be distinguished from the quest for egalitarian democracy. Given that majority rule is usually
considered the most democratic decision rule,' 67 our commitment to political equality
simply does not preclude us from using majority rule in the election phase. Mill's argument is persuasive, therefore, only if we read certain constitutional limitations of the
majority rule into the very definition of democracy. Professor Christiano's argument
also faces a similar problem, as he presupposes a broad view of the political process and
a quasi-delegate theory of representation. 168 Neither of them should be taken for granted.
Whether we like it or not, we live in a world where people have different visions of
representative democracy and/or different expectations of politics, and the requirements
of political equality vary accordingly.
The relative property of political equality leads us to accept Professor Beitz's conclusion that "considerations of political equality or fairness do not necessarily require
adoption of proportional representation."' 69 Of course, PR advocates can still argue that
PR is more desirable than other electoral systems, even on the ground that it "optimizes"
the procedural fairness of the overall political process, as Professor Christiano suggests.170 However, concerns of equality or fairness cannot be separated from conceptions
of representation and democratic politics; we simply cannot choose one electoral system
without accepting its underlying assumptions about what role representatives should
play and how democratic politics should work. Concerns of political equality are not

164. THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE RULE OF THE MANY: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY

233 (1996).
165. Id. at 233-34.
166. While conceding that democracy requires that legislative decision-making be subjected to the rule of
the numerical majority, Mill seeks to constrain the power of the majority by using PR in the election phase.
See MILL, supra note 162, at 129-31, 143-45.
167. For a dialectic assessment of majority rule, see ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 13552 (1989).
168. CHRISTIANO, supra note 164, at 233 ("Only if legislators are delegates of citizens with respect to aims
lof the society] can we have equality with regard to control over the laws and policies of the society").
169. BEITZ, supra note 161, at 125.
170. See also WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND MEMORY, supra n6te 70, at 218.
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decisive because competing visions of representative democracy still exist, and their
disagreements are not entirely reconcilable.'71
Focusing on the concerns of representativeness, we may proceed from a popular
idea in comparative politics that proportional representation and majoritarian representation exemplify two different visions of representative democracy. 72 I elaborate on the
underlying assumptions of these two ideal types of electoral systems in the following
two sections. If PR and majoritarian representation do imply different visions of representative democracy, does that mean our concerns of representativeness are predicated
on the kind of politics we want to pursue? In the last section of this chapter, I will reevaluate the lessons that institutional engineers can learn from such philosophical reflections.
A. The GuinierianHope
The idea of PR is often intertwined with a distrust of simple majorities, a typical
sentiment of elitism. As Professor Powell puts it, "[p]roportionalism is the contemporary democratic face of the tendency to limit the power of the people." 173 This characterization is vividly demonstrated by Mill, who voices his dislike for "collective mediocrity" and his confidence in the natural leadership of elites once they could be elected
through PR. 174 The prevalence of PR in the wake of the adoption of universal suffrage in
certain European countries during the early 20th century also seemed to be motivated by
the self-preservation of the then ruling elites. 175But whatever it once was, the advocacy
of PR is no longer dominated by the sentiment of elitism. Today, many students of democracy support PR not because it would limit the power of the people, but--on the
contrary-because it would empower the people by revivifying democratic participation. In honor of Professor Guinier's contribution to transforming PR from an eliteoriented strategy into a project of participatory democracy, I call this newborn idea of
using PR to regenerate democracy the "Guinierian hope."
Professor Guinier's scholarship developed from her deep concern for the marginalization of racial minorities under the district-based, winner-take-all electoral politics in
the United States.' 76 Racially polarized voting patterns prompted Professor Guinier to
question whether the winner-take-all majority rule can maintain political fairness and
promote social justice in such a divided society. 177 The controversies of creating majority-minority districts as remedies for "vote dilution," pursuant to Section II of the Voting
Right Act, have further prompted her to criticize the problems of districting and seek
other mechanisms to fulfill the ideal of democratic fair play. 78 But Professor Guinier's
concern is not limited to the plight of racial minorities. Using the metaphor of the
171. See POWELL, ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at 237.

172. See LIJPHART, PATrERNS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 1-8; POWELL, ELECTIONS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at 4-7.

173. POWELL, ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY, supranote 36, at 90.
174. See MILL, supra note 162, at 143-47.
175. See Caries Boix, Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies, Vol. 93, No.3 AM. POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 609, 609-10 (1999) (arguing that the adoption of PR
was a ruling elites' response to universal suffrage, "which led to the massive entry of mostly left-wing voters").
176. See generally GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, supra note 56.

177. Id. at 77-82.
178. Id. at 119-56.
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miner's canary, Professors Guinier and Torres later transform their criticism of racial
politics in the United States into a general attack on the fundamental flaws in the winner-take-all electoral system:
[T]he canary metaphor reminds us that experiences which converge around a racial
minority are often a diagnostic tool. Starting with the experience of people of color,
we can begin to identify the crucial missing elements of American democracymissing elements that make the system fail not just for blacks or Latinos but for many
other groups that are similarly situated .... Winner-take-all territorial districting is
fundamentally flawed because some minority-black, Republican, or Green-will
always feel unrepresented .... And not surprisingly, this zero-sum electoral system
depresses voter turn-out, further eviscerating democracy .... Ostensibly developed to
protect the people from an unelected monarchy, our winner-take-all elections have
recreated a political hierarchy that diminishes the people's role in determining their
own destiny and privileges institutional order over widespread and ongoing public
participation.179
In response to these problems, Professors Guinier and Torres propose the use of PR
as the key to transform democracy. They recommend PR not only because it can facilitate meaningful participation of electoral minorities in the political process, but also
because it can strengthen the representational relationship between citizens and their
representatives, foster the development of grassroots political organizations, promote
issue-oriented elections and public deliberations, and ultimately, bring about positivesum policy outcomes. 80 The participatory democracy envisioned by Professors Guinier
and Torres is surely appealing. But how can the adoption of PR induce such a chain
reaction? To answer this question, we have to look into the concept of representation
and the logic of politics embedded in the Guinierian hope.
1. Interest Representation and Representative as Delegate
Proportional representation basically assumes that the electorate is composed of
various groups of people with different interests and tastes. Under this assumption, PR
aims to enable each group to elect a number of representatives roughly proportional to
the size of the group.' 8' The concept of "interest representation," or "group representation," therefore, marks the central idea of proportional representation. Unlike majoritarianism, which tends to de-emphasize the divergence of human interests and the role
of groups in formulating and mobilizing political actions,' 82 proportionalism explicitly
recognizes that there are different interests in society and that these interests should be
fairly represented. In view of PR's emphasis on interest representation, it seems quite
natural that it tends to encourage issue-oriented campaigns and the development of ideologically cohesive political parties.

179. See GUINIER & TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY, supra note 56, at 171-72.
180. See id. at 209-13.
181. See POWELL, ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at 93.
182. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (stating that "[Ilegislators represent people,
not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests").
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Certainly, the winner-take-all, district-based electoral system may accommodate the
reality of group politics through the practices of redistricting or gerrymandering.1 83 But
the enterprise of districting is highly problematic for at least three reasons: (1) territory
is not an effective proxy for interests other than geographical interests; (2) territorial
districting implies the danger of imposing stigma because the boundary of the district is
fixed involuntarily from the voters' perspective; (3) as long as the constituency within a
district is not politically homogeneous, the winner-take-all voting procedure will produce the problem of "representational synecdoche," which means "the part substituted
for the whole. ' 184 By contrast, the concept of interest representation embedded in PR
implies three assumptions that seek to break the limits of territorial districting and reconcile the tension between liberal individualism and group politics: (1) To avoid the
problem of representational synecdoche, representatives should represent unanimous
constituencies;' 85 (2) Apart from geographical interests, group interests defined by other
social cleavages should also be fairly represented;' 86 (3) Voters should be able to identify or define their interests voluntarily; in other words, "[a]ll voters should district
themselves by the way they cast their ballots."' 187 From the standpoint of interest representation, PR advocates seem to have
good reasons to believe that PR will function bet88
ter than the majoritarian systems.1
Two relevant ideas of representation can be further inferred from the notion of interest representation embraced by PR. First, by assuring that the diverse interests in a
society are fairly represented in the representative body, PR exemplifies the idea of "descriptive representation" at the institutional level;' 89 "representation" in the context of
190
PR, accordingly, means "resemblance," "reflection," or "accurate correspondence.,'
This theoretical characterization helps to explain why PR proponents believe that "a
perfect representation is plainly inconsistent with the exclusion of minorities.' ' 9' It also
indicates that "accountability," when construed as the retrospective control over policymakers who are responsible for the policies, plays a less significant role in the vision of
proportional representation than in the majoritarian vision. 192 Secondly, because interest
representation is meaningless unless the representatives are loyal to their constituents in
post-election bargaining, PR necessarily embraces a concept of representation that treats
representatives as "delegates," at least in certain important issues. 193 As Professors
Guinier and Torres suggest, "[t]he representative is chosen to reflect a political mandate
on the issues and is in this sense a delegate of his or her constituents. But the represen-

183. DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED

STATES 48 (2002).

184. For criticisms of the territory-based districting, see GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, supra
note 55, at 127-37; GUINIER & TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY, supra note 56, at 173-202.
185. GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, supra note 55, at 140.
186. Id.
187. GUINIER & TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY, supra note 56, at 196 (italics omitted).
188. See James A. Gardner, Madison's Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of ElectoralSystems, 86
IOWA L. REV. 87, 163-65 (2000).
189. It should be noted that at the individual level, Professor Guinier argues against the idea of descriptive
representation that emphasizes the physical likeness between individual representatives and their constituencies; see GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, supra note 55, at 12-13.
190. HANNA FENICHEL PITKtN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 62 (1967).

191. Id. at 63.
192. See POWELL, ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at 50.
193. See CHRISTIANO, supranote 164, at 233.
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tative, informed by his
or her constituents' interests, is also empowered to exercise judg'' 94
ment and discretion.
The delegate or quasi-delegate model of representation is rather important for the
justification of PR as a mechanism of participatory democracy; if the representatives do
not act as delegates and have plenary leeway to play the game of politics, the promise
that PR will empower the people is nothing but a rubber check issued by political elites.
Apparently, there is a tension between the delegation requirement of participatory democracy and the need to have a deliberative assembly, which cannot function without
giving the representatives certain discretion. The strict or pure delegate model proposed
by the Anti-Federalists is simply not an option for the modem representative democracy.
195But to argue that the model of representation associated with PR can nevertheless be
labeled as a "quasi-delegate model" or "delegate model" in a loose sense, we must demonstrate that (1) the act of voting conveys an intelligible message of delegation, and (2)
mechanisms are in place to enforce the voters' delegation, or, hold the representatives
accountable. Since none of these elements are self-evident in the relationship between
voters and their representatives under PR, whether PR can really serve as a means to
participatory democracy remains in doubt.
To unravel the mystery of the quasi-delegate model, Professor Christiano resorts to
the function of political parties: Under the list-PR system favored by Professor Christiano, parties are expected to develop "specific and distinctive packages of proposals"
for voters to choose, and after an election, these packages can be construed as mandates
from their supporters; 196 besides, parties "can play an important oversight role in guaran' 197
teeing that individual candidates actually pursue the aims for which they are elected."
Accordingly, PR's tendency to encourage the development of ideological and disciplined parties, as I mentioned earlier, is closely related to the substantiation of the quasidelegate theory. Professor Christiano's argument may justify such development under
PR, but we still don't know to what extent party leaders will construe and enforce voters' delegations faithfully. Nor can this rationale apply to other PR or semi-PR systems
that are less dependent on political parties. To accommodate the need to have a closer
tie between voters and their representatives, these systems can only rely on other
mechanisms of accountability, mechanisms that are not directly related to PR. 198
2. Post-Election Bargaining and Power-Sharing Politics
A student of modem democracy may wholeheartedly agree that in a plural society
people have divergent interests and opinions, and that these different voices need to be
presented and heard in the process of collective decision-making. But does the assumption of interest pluralism compel us to conclude that PR is better than majoritarian representation? Professor Gardner suggests that it does because he asserts that the winnertake-all system would make it unnecessary for majorities to negotiate and deliberate
with minorities. 199 Professor Beitz, on the other hand, invites us to think twice. In
194. GUINIER & TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY, supra note 56, at 212.
195. See WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND MEMORY, supra note 70, at 228.

196.
197.
198.
199.

See CHRISTIANO, supra note 164, at 231.
Id.at 223.
See WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND MEMORY, supra note 70, at 230-33.
See Gardner, supra note 188, at 164.
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measuring PR and majoritarian representation against the interest of deliberative responsibility, Professor Beitz suggests:
The real differences between these systems involve the stage within the process of
election and representation at which the positions are articulated and the framework
within which divergent positions are compromised to form workable political coalitions. In proportional representation, these functions take place largely within the legislature itself under the aegis of parties or groups of legislators representing various
constellations of interest; in district representation, they normally occur at an earlier
stage-for example, in the selection of party candidates and in the formation of party
platforms-where there may be substantial competitive incentives to take account of
2
minority interests. 00
Whether majoritarian representation can sustain public deliberation as vigorously as
under PR is an empirical question that calls for further discussion. But Professor Beitz
is probably right on one point: Even if both PR and majoritarian representation share the
same assumption of interest pluralism, they still differ from each other over how and
when a society's divergent interests should be considered. One way to discern the differences between the proportional and majoritarian visions of politics is to ask what
should be counted as the "decisive stage" of the political process. The majoritarian
vision, according to Professor Powell, regards the election phase as the decisive stage
"at which the choice of the majority [of the electorate] should prevail in setting the
guidelines of public policy. ' 20 1 Since government formation and policy-making should
be determined or controlled by the people, the negotiation and bargaining of different
interests should take place in the electoral process before the people deliver their verdict
on Election Day. By contrast, the proportional vision assumes that the decisive stage of
the political process is the policy-making that takes place in the representative government in between elections.20 2 Since many important decisions are actually made by policymakers-as opposed to the people-through a process of deliberation, negotiation,
bargaining, and logrolling, the principle of political equality would command that different interests be fairly represented and contemplated in the legislature. These two
perceptions of politics can also be formulated in terms of the roles that elections play:
while majoritarian representation enables citizens to control policymakers, PR gives
citizens opportunities to influence policymakers.2 °3
Proponents of PR advance several arguments to explain why they consider the postelection legislative process as the decisive stage of collective decision-making. For
instance, the election phase may occur too early or be too short of a period to be the sole
decisive stage; 2° 4 the problem of "multiple majorities on multiple issues" also asks for "a
more complex pattern of bargaining and negotiation to build new majorities as issues are
addressed in policy making. ' 20 5 Given the complexity of policy-making, PR advocates
have reason to condemn the majoritarian vision of citizen control as an illusory promise.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

BEITZ, supra note 161, at 137-38.
POWELL, ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at 89.

Id. at 90.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
Id. at 90.
Id. at 70.
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When I requested Professor Guinier to comment in this regard, she said that "the majoritarian vision only fools the people and minimizes their role in politics."
What is at issue is not just a matter of timing. Another relevant debate centers
around what decision rule should be used in determining the outcomes of policymaking. Although the proportional vision of politics does not necessarily repel the principle of majority rule, 206 many PR advocates do challenge the adequacy of simple majority rule, especially when it is used in the context of a divided society. Professor
Guinier, for example, criticizes majority rule, for it cannot achieve reciprocal outcomes
or promote public deliberation when majorities are fixed. 20 7 Professor Lijphart, another
standard bearer of PR, also argues against the use of majority rule in pluralistic societies,
because "minorities that are continually denied access to power will feel excluded and
discriminated against and may lose their allegiance to the regime. ''20 8 The ideal of politics embraced by Professors Guinier and Lijphart underscores the importance of inclusiveness, meaningful participation, compromise, coalition-building, and consensus.
They further contend that these objectives can only be achieved through cooperation and
power-sharing among the political elites. The advocacy of PR, in this regard, is associof "power-sharing democracy," or, a more fancy term, "consociaated with the vision
20 9
democracy.
tional
B. The MajoritarianVision
The arguments for proportional representation have been so well articulated over
the past few decades that many masters of constitutional engineering think highly of this
kind of electoral system. But even in the context of a divided society, the most favorable setting for PR advocates, the adoption of PR has not necessarily promoted political
justice and social harmony. Goodwill simply cannot guarantee positive results. Professor Donald Horowitz, a long-term dissenter from Professor Lijphart's consociational
theory, advances several objections to this popular approach. Among other things, it
might be too naive to expect that statesmanship will prompt group leaders to pursue
political compromise; even when a compromise across group lines is made by some
leaders, it may be denounced as a sellout by others. 210 In sum, although PR does induce
the inclusion of smaller parties within the legislature, it remains an open question
whether doing so will promote group cooperation and enhance the political support
among electoral minorities, or will perpetuate the segregation along the social cleav21
ages. '
In any event, the grand debate over the relative desirability of PR versus majoritarian representation continues to rage. The majoritarian vision still appeals to many
people because it envisions a representative democracy that has a strong and direct connection between votes, legislative seats and governments.21 2 The use of the singlemember district also promotes constituency service and strengthens the links between
206. DAHL, supra note 160, at 101.
207. See GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, supranote 55, at 77-80.
208. LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 32-33.
209. For discussions of power-sharing democracy or consociational democracy, see generally THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 1168-72; see also Lijphart, supra note 111.
210. See Horowitz, supra note 7, at 20-22.
211. See THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 208-16.
212. See POWELL, ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at 124.
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voters and their representatives. 213 But how would the majoritarians respond to the accusations brought by the proportionalists? It seems to me that there are at least three
strategies for the majoritarians to defend their position, and each of these represents a
distinct version of the majoritarian vision.
1. Decisive Elections and Competitive Democracy
The first strategy is to argue that, although majoritarian representation is imperfect,
it is the only way to ensure that elections are effective instruments of citizen control.
Under this line of argument, assuring the decisiveness of elections is the most important
requirement of democracy, for the liberal veto (i.e., the rejection of incumbents)though being a minimal idea of democracy-is all we can ask for. As Professor Riker
suggests:
Social choice theory forces us to recognize that the people cannot rule as a corporate
body in the way that populists suppose. Instead, officials rule, and they do not represent some indefinable popular will. Hence they can easily be tyrants, either in their
own names or in the name of some putative imaginary majority. Liberal democracy
2 14
is simply the veto by which it is sometimes possible to restrain official tyranny.
Professor Riker's argument is powerful for'those who believe in the idea of competitive democracy. If democracy means nothing but producing an effective government
that is accountable to the people, then proportional representation is simply an alien and
dangerous idea because it can hardly ensure the electoral accountability of the government. 21 5 Judge Posner is the latest advocate of this "minimal" yet "realistic" vision of
democracy; although refusing to be a simple majoritarian, Judge Posner argues that it is
better for society to have more moderate, more centrist, and less passionate politics,
which results from the functioning of the winner-take-all system.21 6 Maybe the idea of
competitive democracy does favor or even compel the adoption of majoritarian representation, but competitive democracy is no more privileged than other visions of democracy. Judge Posner seeks to justify the relative desirability of competitive democracy on
the grounds of pragmatic considerations. But are the sentiment of political stability and
the preference for moderate politics more "realistic" than the aspiration for public participation and deliberation? Even an "everyday pragmatist" might disagree with Judge
Posner's conclusions.

213. See THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 209.
214. WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 244 (1982).
215. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 272-73 (1984) ("If acceptance of leadership is the true function of the electorate's vote, the case for proportional representation collapses because its premises are no longer binding"); POWELL, ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY,
supra note 36, at 11-12 ("[i]f policy-making resources were divided among numerous parties or groups or if
the policy-making coalitions changed from issue to issue, then it would be difficult for citizens to use elections
as instruments of accountability").
216. See POSNER, supra note 53, at 172-78.
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2. Pre-Electoral Deliberations and the Incentives Approach to Power-Sharing Politics
The second strategy for the defense of majoritarian representation takes more seriously the interests in public deliberation and the quest for political compromise. The
basic idea of this strategy is to demonstrate that majoritarian representation can serve
these interests at least as well as PR. Professor Beitz, for example, argues that district
representation can promote a broad scope for public debate if "the process of candidate
selection and the internal governance of the parties" are regulated to pursue this end. 17
Professor Horowitz also suggests that by means of "vote-pooling arrangements" (such
as Alternative Vote or Majority-Runoff), majoritarian systems can create strong incentives for pre-electoral coalitions and accommodative behavior, which21 8can reduce intergroup conflict and promote political compromise in a divided society.
This strategy responds to the main charges against the majoritarian vision of politics; it aims to prove that majoritarian representation can adapt to interest pluralism and
even facilitate the ideal of power-sharing politics. However, the practical effectiveness
of using majoritarian systems to pursue objectives that are usually associated with PR is
still questionable. The success of this vein of arguments is not a matter of logic, but a
matter of empirical findings.
3. Implementing Virtuous Politics
The last strategy, adopted by Professor Gardner, is to defend majoritarian representation on an assumption of politics that is entirely different from interest pluralism. In
view of the difficulties in defending the majoritarian systems on the pluralist assumption, Professor Gardner argues that only through a different lens-a lens that enables us
to view politics from the perspective of republicanism or populism-can we appreciate
the merits of majoritarian representation.
[J]ust as PR is the electoral system best suited to a conception of politics as interest
pluralism, so winner-take-all electoral systems are perfectly suited to achieve the
goals of politics understood as a politics of virtue. If the common good is objective
and unitary; if the purpose of politics is to identify and implement this common good;
if the people have either the ability to identify the best and wisest representatives, or
the virtue and wisdom to discern the common good directly; and if a majority of the
people know these things better than any minority; then a winner-take-all electoral
219
system must be the electoral system of choice.
The genius of Professor Gardner's argument is to mold the ideas of republicanism
and populism into a conception of politics that can turn all the alleged weaknesses of
majoritarian representation into its very strengths. Since the purpose of politics is to
implement the objective, unitary common good of the entire polity, which is best identified by the majority of the people or their representatives, the clash and accommodation
of competing interests are no longer legitimate concerns. Once the common good has

217. BErrz, supra note 161, at 138.
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been identified, the voices of electoral minorities should be disregarded because their
failure to become the majorities also means that their political views are wrong on the
merits. 22 0 PR, on the other hand, has difficulty in achieving the ideal of virtuous politics

embraced by republicanism or populism: "[a]ny electoral system that would deliberately
introduce into the legislature representatives committed to the advancement of incorrect
positions1 can only make it harder for the political process to achieve the common
22

good.,

Certainly, the vision of virtuous politics is deeply rooted in Western political
thoughts. What Professor Gardner endeavors to do is to resurrect the faith in the common good and use it to save the winner-take-all electoral system, which is indefensible-in Professor Gardner's eyes-with the assumption of interest pluralism. The
common good, however, is a theoretical construction whose existence cannot bI vindicated by modem social science; like any claim of the moral truths, its validity is based
on whether we believe in it or not. Whether the vision of virtuous politics can be sustained in our modem or postmodern world, as Professor Gardner notes, is a key problem
with this approach.222
The revival of republicanism in the United States over the past two decades may
give some credit to Professor Gardner's faith in civic virtue, but probably not to his
confidence in majoritarian representation. Given that the ideal of virtuous politics
should play some meaningful role in our political life, it is still uncertain which type of
electoral systems it would endorse. The abstract doctrine simply begets different constructions. Professor Sunstein, for example, suggests that PR may enhance, not undermine, the political process of Madisonian democracy by ensuring "that processes of
deliberation are not distorted by the mistaken appearance of a common set of interests
on the part of all concerned. 223 Similarly, in a mass democracy where representation
and the division of political labor are inevitable, even a faithful populist may still wonder which system-PR or majoritarian representation-actually carries out the will of
the people.
4. Common Themes
The multiplicity of the defense strategies indicates that majoritarian representation
is an ideologically ambiguous concept. Whereas Judge Posner wants to discard the ideal
of deliberative democracy and build his case on the assumption of competitive democracy, Professor Gardner regards the vision of virtuous politics as the savior of the winner-take-all system. Nonetheless, we can identify some common themes of the majoritarian vision with respect to the concept of representation and the logic of politics.
(1) Virtual Representation: In response to the charge of "representational synecdoche," a standard answer of majoritarian representation is "virtual representation," the
idea that expands representation beyond the relationship between a representative and
his/her actual constituents. 224 As long as a representative is not merely the agent of the
voters who voted for him/her, but has a moral obligation to look after other constituent
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 143-45.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 169-71.
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1588 (1988).
See PrTKIN, supra note 190, at 173-76.

Journalof Legislation

[Vol. 30:2

interests, there is no representational deficit. The idea of virtual representation is often
associated with theories of civic republicanism and deliberative democracy.22 A believer in competitive democracy may also embrace this idea to justify the representatives' wide discretion. But Professor Guinier is definitely not comfortable with this
concept. Professor Guinier not only points to the failure of virtual representation in the
real world, but also warns us of its threat to the values of participation.226 Resolving the
"tension between ideal and achievement" 227 of virtual representation, accordingly, is
basically an assignment for the majoritarians.
(2) DistrictRepresentation:The single-member district is the cornerstone of majoritarian representation; a majoritarian electoral system without territorial districts is simply unimaginable. In addition to the necessity of territorial districts, which can be
viewed as the spatial dimension of majoritarian representation 8 a majoritarian can
advance several arguments for district/territorial representation. For instance, since
people do not choose their residence randomly, territory is undeniably an important
proxy for interests. 229 By maintaining "effective links between voters and their representatives," territorial representation also creates strong incentives for representatives to
provide local constituency service. 230 Besides, as Professor Calabresi suggests, district
elections tend to be less ideological and, for this reason, politics may be more moderate. 23 1 But above all, the single-member district substantiates the idea of "geographic
accountability," ensuring that voters can identify and control their representatives even
on the individual level.232
(3) ElectoralAccountability and Representative as Trustee: According to Professor
Powell, the majoritarian vision basically regards elections as the decisive stage of the
democratic political process. Because of its strong effect in creating a clear legislative
majority, majoritarian representation enables citizens to control policymakers either by
mandating their future governments prospectively or by evaluating the accountability of
the incumbent governments retrospectively.233 Conceivably, government accountability
is the major concern of the majoritarian vision of citizen control. The advancement of
electoral accountability is also considered the main virtue of majoritarian representation. 23 But majoritarian democracy is not by definition a regime where the people rule.
Except for the populists, supporters of majoritarian representation usually embrace a
trustee model of representation that gives representatives considerable discretion in
making independent judgments.235 Professor Powell also reminds us that "it is something of an illusion to think that the mechanical processes of vote-seat-government connections in majoritarian systems are shaped more by citizens and less by party leaders
225. See Gardner, supra note 188, at 144; see also AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY
AND DISAGREEMENT, 144-64 (1996).
226. See GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, supra note 55, at 130-32, 218 n. 100.
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229. See Briffault, supra note 70, at 442.
230. THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 209.
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tends to cut across ideology and to de-emphasize it").
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than are the bargaining processes of vote-seat-policymaker connections in proportional
systems. 236 In regard to the tug of war between people and ruling elites, it seems that
the majoritarian and the proportional visions have achieved an similar equilibrium
through different approaches.
C. Beyond the Dichotomy
Defining and maintaining the appropriate relationship between the people and their
representatives are perpetual dilemmas facing representative democracies. The ongoing
debate over the relative desirability of PR versus majoritarian representation reminds us
that we are not at the end of the history of democracy. Since there are substantial disagreements about desirable approaches to politics, and since the majoritarian and proportional visions of democracy each have distinctive advantages and notable disadvantages, trade-offs---especially the trade-off between "accountability" and "responsiveness"-are simply inevitable.237 A thorough inquiry and serious reflection may save
electoral engineers from bias, misunderstanding and distortion. But in the end, a choice
must be made.
How should electoral engineers make their decisions? Professor Gardner suggests
that "in choosing an electoral system we cannot escape the necessity of choosing among
conceptions of politics, or at least of choosing which conception of politics will be favored by institutional circumstances. To choose an electoral system is thus to put a
thumb on the political scales."238 It seems that Professor Gardner rightly suggests that
PR and majoritarian representation exemplify two different visions of representative
democracy, and that our concerns of representativeness are significantly predicated on
the brand of politics we intend to pursue. But the rule of thumb suggested by Professor
Gardner is actually plagued by ambiguity or indeterminacy. Interest pluralism does not
necessarily lead us to adopt PR, nor does the ideal of virtuous politics unconditionally
endorse majoritarian representation. Reflections on political philosophies may provide
us some meaningful guidance, yet they are by no means conclusive. In choosing an
electoral system, pragmatic considerations are as important as our political faith.
In any case, the choices facing electoral engineers are more complicated than the
majoritarian-proportional dichotomy indicates.
Electoral proportionality is better
viewed as a continuum with multiple possibilities, and there are several ways to maneuver electoral proportionality. In other words, not only must electoral engineers determine how proportional or disproportional the electoral system should be, but they also
have to decide how to achieve the anticipated proportionality. The electoral engineering
for majoritarian representation appears simple on its face; one may argue that all we
need is the single-member district with the plurality or majority formula. But majoritarian representation is by no means a unitary concept. Electoral engineers have to
choose between different districting policies, which to a certain extent may reflect different versions of majoritarianism. The options multiply when we move toward the
direction of proportional representation. Engineers can set different electoral thresholds
to control the degree of electoral proportionality. They can also choose different sys236. POWELL, ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at 155.
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tems, which highlight different ideas of proportional representation. The candidatecentered STV and CV, for example, seem to embrace the idea of "geographic accountability" usually envisioned by majoritarians, whereas the party-based List-PR system
implements a quasi-delegate model of representation.
During recent years, there has been a visible tendency toward hybrid systems (systems that combine SMD with List PR, such as MMP and Parallel Systems) in comparative politics. Professor Horowitz suggests that such a tendency "reflects a desire to graft
one institution on to another rather than to design an ensemble of institutions. 239 Pro
fessor Olga Shvetsova, on the other hand, argues that "[iun most cases, the adoption of
the mixed electoral system was a result of political bargaining and compromise between
parties and politicians who favored pure PR and those who preferred majoritarian elections. 24° Our prior discussions on the case of Taiwan indicate another possibility: a
semi-proportional Parallel system might be chosen as a response to concerns of governability in presidential democracies. No matter what is the case, the emergence of the
hybrid systems does present new challenges to the discourse of representativeness.
These hybrids indicate that majoritarian and proportional visions are not mutually exclusive. They might even envision a "Third Way of electoral politics" that has not been
fully captured in the majoritarian-proportional dichotomy. If we still believe that concerns of representativeness should play some role in electoral engineering, and that our
visions of politics and democracy should guide our choice of electoral system, then we
had better extend our imagination beyond the old dichotomy.
This theoretical reflection also invites us to reconsider the cases of the United States
and Taiwan. After years of vigorous debate along the battle line of majoritarianism
versus proportionalism, it seems that discourse of electoral reform in the United States
has been stuck by entrenched disagreements. The disagreements persist because many
participants in this grand debate take the choice of electoral system as a matter of principle, leaving little room for pragmatic considerations. Though the grand debate between
majoritarians and proportionalists has provided a great contribution to our understanding
of democracy, the prevalence of "electoral fundamentalism" might have forced people
to take sides in this debate rather than seeking consensus and compromise. By paying
more attention to studies of comparative politics, maybe Americans can release their
imagination from the cage of the majoritarian-proportional dichotomy and learn that
thoughtful engineering is capable of making fairer trade-offs between "accountability"
and "responsiveness."
By contrast, the discourse of electoral reform in Taiwan seems to suffer from lack
of philosophical reflections. Electoral engineers in Taiwan are pragmatic enough to
resist electoral fundamentalism. But because concerns of representativeness are not the
major axis of the proposed electoral reform, the vision of democracy underlying the
current reform proposal has not been fully articulated. In the absence of a clear vision,
scholars who favor the MMP system often criticize the proposed semi-proportional Parallel System as an unjustified compromise. To defend the reform proposal from the
perspective of representativeness, electoral engineers in Taiwan may have to find a more
solid ground of political philosophy for their pragmatic considerations.
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V. CONCLUSION

This Article aims to reappraise the current academic debate on the prospects of proportional representation in presidential systems. Based on the case study of electoral
reforms in the United States and Taiwan, my research confirms that governability and
representativeness are the central concerns of electoral engineering. After a close examination of the relevant normative arguments and empirical evidence, I argue that
neither the nightmare of constitutional breakdown nor the hope of consociational democracy should dictate our political judgment in designing the legislative electoral system. Instead, we should make the inevitable trade-offs on the grounds of pragmatic
considerations as well as philosophical reflection.
"Governability" and "representativeness" can be viewed as the two dimensions of
electoral engineering. Electoral engineers will face difficult trade-offs or judgment calls
within these two dimensions, respectively. With respect to concerns of govemability,
electoral engineers in presidential democracies have to make a trade-off between effective government and substantive separation of power. In regard to concerns of representativeness, they need to balance "accountability" and "responsiveness" and then choose
or formulate their visions of representative democracy accordingly. The most difficult
task of electoral engineering, however, is to reconcile the possible tension between governability and representativeness. There is no magic formula in this regard, but at least
we should give equal weight to these two concerns before making our final judgment.
Electoral engineering, as political theorist Pitkin reminds us, is a difficult but not
hopeless challenge. The engineering of electoral proportionality in presidential democracies will continue to be a controversial issue, and it is imperative that we resist the
allure of the "one-size-fits-all" solutions. Informed and less biased judgments are attainable, I believe, as long as our minds are open, yet critical.

